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----------
-~--------
Contrary to the 'myth of invincibility which frequently 
· enshrouds the history of the Royal Navy, there was no par~ ticular reason to cause an·observer to predict. a British victory in the War against the French Republic" At the outbreak of the war 0 England had a smaller navy than France. In addition,_ France had won.the most recent war between the two countrieso Finally O . France was c:>p_yt91.1~ly __ a _l_arg_er __ , ___________ ----'----,-~~--------C.----!-----s--tronger11- more·-populous ··country.than Engla.ndo 
-
•• i (, ............ ,-, . 
.. --------- ~------- -
.Yet England won all the naval battleso This is due in part to the weaknesses of the French navy caused by the French Revolutiono- But more important, it is due to the officers of the British navyo 
Because these British officers were human, they had both personal strengths and weaknesses. Yet because of their positions of high responsibility, their personal friendships and feuds often had a profound effect on the course of the waro This thesis studies how their inter-personal relationships influenced the conduct of the War against the French Republic, sometimes for the better, arrl sometimes for the worse. 
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CHAPTER I: - THE STATE OF THE NAVY, 1783-1792 
-~-~------~-:_:~~~:------~--- --- ·· .·· .· --·· - -- --When- tiilliam··Pi"i::.·t·J:,ecame p·ri-me-Miriistei: of- Great· Br1t-ain-:··- ----------- --
- - - --- - ------ -- ,-----------·-------·-~----- .. 
"k< -·· 
... 
__ : ____ ,:__- --·-----. ·-------~---. --
·- ----····---~ .. -
in 1783, he discovered that one of his first tasks would have 
to be the reb~ilding of the_ Royal Navy. The recent loss of 
the war against the American colonies had demonstrated serious 
e-def i c i enc i es wi th·in the Navy, and Pitt immediately began a· 
personal supervision of the fleet that was to last for eighteen· 
. years. Discovering, as Admiral Byam Martin h~d .· noted, that ' 
there -was "not a sound s·hip in the fleet"; 1 Pitt sought and 
closely followed. the advice of Sir Charles Middleton, the able 
comptroller of the Navy. 
Pitt first initiated a Parliamentary inquiry.into the· 
state of the dockyards. This inquiry prompted reforms which 
left the dockyards so enlarged and expanded that they were 
d . th abl . t 2 _prepare to cope wi any re·ason e requiremen • During 
' Pitt's first five years in office, he spent over t?,000,000 
____ . __ .. on improving the Navy, and within his first seven years in 
\ 
office, he ordered twenty-four new ships of the line con-
structea.3 For a peace Minister to spend so much time· and 
1. Jo Holland Rose, et al, eds., The Growth of the New Ern-pireo Volo II of The Cambrid e Histor of the British Empireo (Cambridge University Press, 1940 Po .39. 
2. Geoffrey Callender and Fo Ho Hinsley, The Naval Side of British History: 1485-19450 (London: ;Christophers, 1952) Po 184. 
3. Jo Holland Rose, \iilliam Pitt and l\J"ational Revival. (Lon-don: Go Bell and Sons, 1911) po 405 
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. ··~ 4·-. 
money on the Navy indicated the Navy 0 s state of disrepair. 
Later. in his Ministry 0 Pitt further strengthened the Navy 
---· ·- ·--·- _____________ _, ___ ------ --- ··--· 
. 
. 
-·· -···-····-···· -···-----·-- -- --'-----:-----.. ------when--war··-threat-ened·-1n:-··179 o~-o·ve·r·--the Noo·tk-a . ·sourid ____ i nci deii t 
( . . 
---- -·---·. ---- ---··-···- ----,----'.~-:-· ~--; 
with Spain and again in the anxious days of 1791 when war 
appeared likely with Russia over Ochakov. 
Pitt's selection of a First Lord of the Admiralty was 
'. 
. . 
; 
. - - .--·· 
--·· ·····'l 
·• 
.. perhaps his only nayi.i,l_ mistake during these y~ars of peace. 
t•' Yet it· was a serious error. On July 16,· 1788, Pitt:·'..invited· ·-·-···-···-· -----.. ---- \ 
. ; ..... 
. 
·-· .. ~-S·--- .• ·-·.-------.- ... -
........ - . 4· I his elder brother John, Second Earl of.Ch~tham, to·take 
\ 
charge of. the Admiralty. Chatham was only thirty-two years·~ 
old and except for a few years in the Army, he had had 
neither administrative nor military experience. Chatham's 
strong points included rendering helpful advice on non-naval 
matters and the personal friendship of King George III, but 
. , 
~' 
• I 
- ¥---·- · . 
.. ........... -~- . he was entirely unsuited for his new post. For example, he 
· .... --'--
.' •• >' . .---J-. ~·· --c~--· -~ --·- -
f. 
\,. 
•, .•w·,r 
(i had great difficulty getting up in the morning, and, since 
much of the Admiralty's business was completed before noon, 
this weakness kept senior naval officers·waiting for his 
attention and earned him the soubriquet of the late Lord 
-~ __ _..__ ........... ~ ·- ...... -~ -' -··". --~-- . 
5 Chatham. Indeed, Chatham was a man of brains who "found 
4. John Pitt, second Earl of Chatham (1756-1835)0 Entered 
the army, 17740 First Lord of the Admiralty, 1788-17930 Promoted to Colonel, 1793; to Major General, 1795; died 
as General and Governor of Gibralter, 18350 DoNoBe 
5. Jo Holland Rose, et al, edsQ, Grotrth of the l\fe't-v Empire, 40. 
6. Arthur Bryant, Years of Endurancee {London: Collins, 1946) p. 
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not to use them." 6 - · ..... 
. ... ... ~ ,.;,. ,-~'-"' . - . 
____ ::_-c.-:-~ ,~ __ co:c==~-------- .Wi±_h ___ sucb __ a wea~ ___ l_~_§'._g.f?_~ ___ at, __ the Admiralty, -it ·is riot 
prising that naval policy was formulated by the Cabinet, al-. 
though none of· its members had any special talent for naval --
------ ____________ _;__.----'---
affairs. Three members of the Cabinet took upon themselves 
the respQnsibility for naval strategy.· The first was the 
· industrious Foreign Secretary, William Grenville. 7 Al though. 
--Grenville was a career diplomat and. extremely attentive to 
detail, he had no military training whatsoever, and attempted 
-to substitute common sense for experience. The second member 
. 8 was Henry D!Indas , whose personality was invariably jovial_ -----------'"---
· but whose ideas of naval affairs wezle all too often imprac-
. 
tical. The third member of this group was Pitt himself, who 
also shared the total lack of military experience. 
- ----· -~-------- ---
-·-- - .. _, __ . __ . ___ -------·- - - -
. ' 
.. 
Thus Britain's primary defense was in the hands of men 
· who had no formal· training in mil.i tary matters. But this very 
serious defect was largely invisible. Britain was at peace 
6.· Arthur Bryant, Years of Endurance. (London: Collins, 1946) p. 84. 
---~----------·-. -7. William Windham Grenville, Baron Grenville (1759-1821). 
.. 
Statesman and diplomat; became Foreign Secretary in 1791-----~ and retained this office until 18010 DoNoBo 
8. Henry Dundas, first Viscount Melville (1742-1811)9 A pro-fessional politician, Dundas held a wide variety of offices, including Secretary of War and Treasurer of the Navyo Al-though of great aid to Pitt in Parliament, he made several serious errors ivl1ile in charge of the Army. D.N ... B • 
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.and had little need for the Navy save to subdue an occasional 
pira.teo There were no major na.va.1 decisions to be made 0 and 
the routine administration was left to the career officers at 
the Admiralty. 
. - ·----------------- ------, -- -- ·---.-- .- --·-· --------:------- ·--------·- - . - -- -· . -- -·- -- -- --------- - ·- -- - -- - -- -------- - --
-----·--· . - . . ' --- . - . ---- - --·-------····-
• 
While ·political control of the Navy might be in weak 
. hands, the internal administration of the· Navy was in the 
very capable hands of the Board of Admiralty. This Board .. ----------- .---·-----··-·:···· . . . - - --- . 
· ·· · '"'\·.Was composed of five men, t~e First Lord of· the Admiralty, .· -. '... . ' . -
·who might be a naval officer or a civilian, as well as four 
Sea Lords, who we.re usually Admirals.. ·The .Firs.t Lord was J . 
... 
appointed by.the Prime Minister and was a member of the· Cab-. .. 
- -- -·---·---.------··-·----
-;. . ·' 
----, -~--------·~ ----·--·- .. , 
. . 
inet. The First Lord also had the respC>.Jisibili ty of selecting 
the Sea Lords. He was free to retain those of. the previous 
administration or to select his own men. Thus, when Chatham 
left the Admiralty in 1793, his· successor, Lord Spencer, re-
tained all of Chatham•s Sea Lords. 9 
•. 
The Admiralty Board was responsible for the internal 
administration of the Navy. Its duties included everything 
from assigning destinations for each ship through ordering 
examinations for promotion for junior officers to recommending 
senior officers for high commands. One advantage of this 
system was that the four Sea Lords generally knew the senior 
9o Julian So Corbett, ed9, Private Papers of George, Second Earl S encer Firs·t Lord of the Admiralt 1794-1801 1 II_ n.pti Navy Records Society, 1914 X1Vo 
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- .... -· persona.lly 0 and were able to recommend .over 
another for a particular assignment requiring particular ta.1-
The First Lord generally accepted their adviceo 
The Sea Lords retained their offices at.the discretion . 
. of. the First Lordo At any time, he could dismiss all or any 
them, but they usually changed only when a new administration 
----,-·--------·---,'-~--~· .. ··· .· ,,' took office,· when·they·-re·t:ired~ or-when one had a serious· dis--
--- -· - - - --~-----·------
-
. -~~-------~---------
agreement with the other Lords over a matter of policy. 
This system seems weaker than it was, for while the First 
·Lo,:d could overrule the other members of the Board and make 
some grievous er,ror, he rarely did so. The First Lord had 
the power to ignore his advisors, but seldom did so because 
the Sea Lords could always resign en masse, which invariably 
' 
~ 
_produced a Parliamentary inquiry. Parliament generally pre-
·sumed the four naval officers collectively could better judge 
naval affairs than the First Lord alone, especially if the 
First Lord was a civilian. Thus, the Sea Lords could often 
. 
sway the First Lord to their point of view by hinting at 
resignation. 
Another check on the theoretically dominant power of 
the First Lord was provided by the Prime Ministero At any 
time, a Prime Minister who was unhappy with his First Lord 
could ask him to resign, as Pitt did in 17930 This method 
of changing a First Lord was only ~pplied if he was clearly 
inadequate for his posto 
'fl 
i; 
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obvious faultso Numerous clerks dealt with the enormous 
paper wor]{ of t~e Admiralty O · and these . clerkships were "Of ten 
.. lucrative rewards for political favors o As Sir Charles 
.. Middleton note<!, clerkships were often sold to the highest 
,,-·•:'···t· 
·bidder 0 and the poor supervision of.Admiralty funds made it· 
rather easy for clerks to divert large sums to· their own 
pockets. Middleton also complained that the lines of organ-
- ' "·-. ' . . -_ -- --
i,zation and responsibility within the Admiralty we,r.e, at best, 
----·----· --~~· 
Furthermore, while the Admiralty had overall re-
sponsibility for the Navy, some important duties were in the 
hands of an independent institution, the Navy Board. This· 
Board had control of food supply, transportatio~, and care 
.. ' - . . ~ . 
of the sick and wounded. 11 
· .. - - · ;, ·· 
. . 
., .. ______________ __,.... _____ ···-
on-the other hand the Admiralty had sole responsibiiity 
for recruiting, training and promoting naval officers. A 
man became a naval officer either .by promotion from the ranks· 
.or by llinterest". Since promotion from the ranks was generally 
a reward for conspicuous bravery in battle and since, by 1792 
10. 
(l 
'.' 
~ 
Ii 
:i 
'1 
,; 
I, 
Sir Charles Middleton (Lord Barham) to Chatham, December, 
17900 John Knox Laughton, edo, Letters and Papers of 
Charles! Lord Barham, Admiral of_the Red sruadron1 1758-1813, II (nepo, Navy Records Society, 1910 I 343-440 
·-·--·-- - ------------------ - ~. 
11. Ce tAJo Crawley, edo, ~qar and Peace in an Age of Upheaval: 
1793-18308 IX of The New Cambrid e Modern Histor 6 
(Cambridge University Press, 1965 , p .. 80 • 
• 
---~----·- .. - ·-- --- - -·· ----···- -- ----- . - ·-------·- -- -- --------··· --------------·---
-- -------- -----
- g __ 
becam.e such by 00 intereston ~ -Each large warship carried a num-
ber -of teenage officer apprentices called midshipmeno- These 
-...... '•. . 
-----~ .. - -- --.. 
- youths owed their appointments to favorable recommendations 
by a Captain 0 an Admiral, friend in the Admiralty 0 Royal Pa-
-
-
___ _ tron, or Parliamentary sponsor. In a word, they owed their 
appointments to-interest. -·- -·-- - --; .... ,. - -.. - . - -
To advance _from Midshipman to Lieutenant, an oral exam-
-
-
.. 
-- -- --- - -----~ ----------.ination was requi·red. But a word in the right ear generally 
" 
guaranteed promotion, as -the career of Admiral Byam Martin -
indicates: 
.. •' _.,._. -
............. - -
On arriving at Spithead, I had the happiness to learn by a letter from my father, who then held the office of comptroller of the navy, 
that an arrangement was under consideration for promoting_me .to the rank of commander, not 
on account of (our) capture of the Enterprise12, - __ --------·-·----
_-or on any other account than the good name, interest and services of my father.13 
But interest was indiscriminate.· Another British of-
ficer, James Gardner, gave .exactly the opposite answer to a 
t 
question put to him by his examiners. Even so, Gardner's 
" interest was sufficient to obtain his commission and to 
12. Throughout this paper, ·the names of all ships are under-lined, even when, as in this case, it is not underlined in the.,,, original o 
13. Diary of Sir Thomas Byam r~1artin, February, 17930 Richard Hamil ton, edo, Le-~ters and Pa ers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas Byam Martin, I n.p.: Navy Records Society, 1901), 173. 
,. -··. : - .- ----~- . -: .. ·:. - -, . ·:.-: _--. ·-·_ . - --
-------- - - .. 
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-----~-----------~--
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'_ prove -that interest -·- could overcome· incompetence. · · 
On the other hand, interest could work agains.t. a man,· 
. . . 
----···--------~,-----c·,----------c-. - --- ----especia.Lly if his patron was out of favor at the Admiralty_! _______ _ 
For example, Lord Hood replied to a letter requesting a 
·recommendation: 
., 
But to be candid with you,. I can be of 
no use to anyone; for Lord Spencer (the 
First Lord o~ the Admiralty) is not con-
tent with .marking me with indifference 
and inattention, but carries it to all. 
who·have any· connexion with me.15 
··.; .- - .,. . -·· .. - - ··- .. - . ·-- .. 
---- - •-, -· .. ----- ·--~ ----· - _µ.._..... ___ .. _ - . - -::... ... -
···.-:·;· . 
----~-- - ----· --
Interest did have its limits, however. It . could not ·" 
. 
-···----- ·- ... ----.-- --~ ~-
... ---~-
carry an officer beyond the rank of Post Captain. Further 
advancement depended solely upon seniority. If, for example, 
promotion, retire~ent .. and death created -ten vacancies in the 
ranks of Rear-Admirals~·· the ten most /senior Captains were 
automatically promoted .. to fill their places. 
-·'!f',...,...w, .....,. • . •, 
____ ~is system contained som~ weaknesses. It automatically 
promoted the incompetent, as well as awarding high office to 
elderly men whose ideas had become fixed in their earlier 
days and who were incapable of adjusting the habits of a 
lifetime to changing circumstances. However, these weaknesses 
, •. ,·1· ' 
/.~,- ·--~ 
···-··~..--· 
• 
.... _,............_ ______ ;;.;...;... ___________________ ~------------
14. Richard Hamilton and John Knox Laughton, edso, Recol-
lections of James Anthony Gardner, Commander RoNa 
{nopo, 1906), p .. l 74u 
15. Lord Hood to William Wolseley, August 2, 1797~ John 
Kno:>c Laughton, ed .. , The Naval Mi~cellany (n.p. Navy 
Records Society, 1918) p.78 • 
.•. 
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.... · _____ ,.__,-----~~·--···.--·, ~.-- -.- . .;.., 
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.......... ..,.... .. - - _..:._ 
were overcome by the distinction made between ·promotion and 
appointmento 'While an officer wa.s guaranteed.promotion, he 
I . . . 
was not assured of active dutyo The Admiralty always ma.naged 
____________ , ______ __:__, ________ :._ __ ~2 have mo~e Admirals than it needed,! and thus could choose 
one or two for- particular assignments while leaving the others 
on half-pay and .without appointments. In this way the Admir~,'. 
al ty preserved·· a freedom of choice as well as a rese·rve of 
officers. Thus, for example, Lord St. Vincent.once recom-
- - -- ---- - - --- -- - --;-·----
··· .··- ·· · .. : ... :.: .. · -_ ~-·---~--~--- -m-ended--t~a.t----th-e-·- Admi-ralty·-:~p:romo:te·---th~~~f-i=-f"--t-e·en=-mos~~~s:e-nior-.,:~-~:-;=:~ .. -.. - -.... :-=-=~·~:~:-~~ 
------- ------·--~·---- •' ~-"-----
-- - ' 'I?•~ - '";.· • 
-- . -~-·-- ~-·-
, 
' captains in order that St. Vincent might entrust part of his· 
-
·fleet to the fifteenth Captain on the list, the only· Captain 
whose professional qualities St~ Vincent respected. 16 
On balance, the system worked very well •. ·1n fact,
1 
by 
1793 it could be said that: 
·, 
... 
·-· ------ - •-------- -------- ---. ---~-·------------ -- ; -- -· - " C •- - - --• - ---- •---.-• -
. As a general rule the British officers . 
were men of high character and great 
., 
-
· capacity, animated with a spirit of zeal 
for the service, trained in the American 
war, and professionally unmatched in any 
navy which ever existea.17 
From 1783 to 1792, these excellent officers led the reforma-
tion of the Navy. -For example, Middleton ordered complete 
provisioning of all. ships in the reserve fleet. Thus, in an 
16. Julian So Corbett, ed., Spencer Papers. II, 9. 
17. Ao iv$ ivard et al, edso 1\~ i;:rench Revolutioper,CI VIII of 
~-C;:-unb1: __ i~dg:e ~1odern I-Ii story. {London: Macmillan Co.,\ 
19()4)0 454. 
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. emergency, these ships · could sail as soon as crews came on . · 
, 
-
~board rather than. wa.i ting for supplies from strained and 
perhaps distant warehouses. In 1790 Adnliral Richard Lord . . 
Howe ini ti_~ted a new flag system for signalling between ship~, 
. especially during battles, which .res_tored mobility to fleet 
· .· · . · -18 
. tactics. 
Another reform carried out in these years of .p-eace 
.. --·--·- ···- ···- ;.~-- ...... • .. -:.... . 
r • • --,. • 
, .... _-:,-.;_-,.c.;.:::""-':.;,.-__:::,_-_ •_•:.._ ~·=---':: .. ~:-::--:-=----~-:~. • =--· -"---c • • -----------.---.- -- ----- - --- - - -· '~-- - - . - --- .. -:::--·· - - - -
_·:._=:~~-------~=.-=-::-~~~=_:~:.·_::c~-~-c-=;=~~~ppli_ed to~ ordinary·.: s·eafuen.-~--:=·.~ Their problems~ included indefinite 
J 
· ,. en·listment, poor wages, poor food, harsh discipline, and other 
----~--..:--- ___., __ -'-'--=-· _-_,_.,., ----. ---- ·-· 
... . 
_complaints which will be examined later. The one reform car-
ried out at this time was a Parliamentary Bill aimed at paying, 
19 . . . the seamen more promptly. : While not of major importance, 
the act demonstrates,Admiralty awareness of seamen's condi- I 
tions and concern to improve them. 
. .. 
·Towards the end of these years of peace, Prime Minister 
' 
Pitt began to reduce the Navy's size. In 17~0, the Navy had 
39,526 seamen; Pitt cut this to 34:~17 in 179120 and in 1792 j 
he reduced the naval budget by 200,000 and cut the seamen 
-----~--.. --··---,-· .. to 16,000. 21 By 1792, only tw~-l~e ·ships of the line22 re-
.. ··---
-~ . 
18. Michael Lewis, Histor} of the British Allen and Unwin, 1957, 1550 - Navy (London: George_~~~-~ __ 
19 .. Parliamen·tary I-Iistory., XXIX, 549-5510 
' · 20.. Ao ~J .. tiard, eda, T11.e French Revolution, 452. 
21. ~villiam Hunt, The I-Iistory of England from the Accession 
of Geor e III to the Close of Pitt us First Administrati'on 1 760-1801 o X of Tl1e Poli ti cal I-Iisto.ry of E_ngland -··-(London: Longmans, Green and Co~, 1905), 333.. -
22. A ship of the line was the largest size warship, roughly 
corresponding to _the modern battleship. 
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· mained in commission, none of·. them in either the . Mediterranean 
· · · . 23 1 of the West Indies •. 
; Pitt believed he had · excellent reasons for reducing· the 
· ·size of the Navy, as he told Parliament early in 1792: 
••• · unquestionably there was never a .. ·. . . . . 
time in the history of this country where 
'--.----·---··--- .·-··---.. _ .... :. __ . from the situation of Europe- we might more 
',' ., ,· I:., 
__ ' '.,<· ... '' .•. '' .. 
. . :-·:- ' ~ ~~ :..., ' .. -.. ·_:_··-·~- .. -- - . . . 
- _,_. ~. . 
., ' 
reasonably expect fifteen years of peac~,_. ____ -----~ ~.--·-- '"··" .. ";,·· than we· may at the present moment. 221 . ····. ---c----- ~~ 
While one of the "world's worst prophecies 11 , 25 it was 
not unreasonable at the time Pitt pronounced it. As a stu- · 
dent of history, Pitt argued that revolutions usually weaken 
,-
' .,; 
a nation's military power. Then, too, so long as the French. 
finances remained critical and French harvests conb.inued bad, 
France appeared incapable of waging war. Pitt failed to 
understand· that France was no longer an old-style power, 
but that it would emerge with modern energies provided by an 
entire nation at war. 
' 
Not was Pitt alone in his mistake. Grenville ag~~ed 
with him and added still another motive for naval retrench-
ment. He believed that the only danger from France was that 
the English common peopleL.would be infected with French 
discontent. Grenville reasoned that if the Navy was reduced, 
23. Arthur Bryant, Years of Endurance, p~ .81. 
240 Parliamentary History, XXIX .. 971. 
2 5. G. M. Trevelyan, Autob~ogra~~ a~~ Other Essays (London: 
Lo11gmans, Green and Co., 1949 , p.c .. 84. 
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.~- ... 14 ·- · 
·-taxes could be lowered, li-ving standards -would ris~, and thus -. 
.--- " 
·_- the danger of ·rebellion would passo Then, -too, he believed 
that since the res·erve fleet was in good repai_r and adequately 
provisioned, the navy could be readied quickly to face any -- . ------· ----·-·· ···--:·· -· --.-------·- .. -- ··-· .. - .. .. . -
· . - .. · 26 
_emergency. · 
. . . 
( . 
. ',· ll '• • But this faith in speedy mobilization was not·warrarited. 
________________ -~~-~~··---=-While· ships and officers_ were available, crewmen were not. The 
Admiralty obtained its crews by impressment, using an officer. 
and a few men to impress (or legally kidnap) any available-
·seamen or healthy men. But as Middleton noted: 
The impress service in its best state ha·s 
never furnished more than 22 or 23,000 men, 
---- ----- ·- - • ..- .. -- -:·r-. 
---.-·.>-.i_ 
.. 
........ ~~1 
-~~,"··"· ··s-· . including every other means, in the first 
year of a war, and which, circumstanced as 
we are at present, will not man one half of the line-of-battle ships that are fit for 
· 27 service ••• 
-_·it,_ Nor was this the only unsolved naval problem at the end 
of 1792. Britain owned 115 ships of the line and 400 smaller -- ·-
1• vessels , but had only twelve ships of the line in commission. 
- --.J • France, Britain• s traditional. rival, owne~ 76 ships of the 
line and 246 smaller vessels, but had 27 ships of the line in 
.} _ commission. 28 Thus, proper deployment of the French Navy at 
the oµtbreak of war could make Britain's speed of mobilization 
26. bord Grenville to Lord Auchland, August 23, 17910 Qrop-Il19re __ P~;eers (no po I:Ii st.oti_~ql_ M.anJ1<~;_c.riD,ts CQJJJID.:Ls..s;lo.n 0_ 1894), II, 1770 
27. Middleton ·to Cl1atham, Augo 27, 17880 Barham Papers, II, 313. 
28. Co Wo Crawley, ed .. , War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval, p .. 83 .. 
_,........ ~-~------
-- =--..... "'-'-I 11 I I I I 
critical to . her safety .. · 
Mere size of the French Navy was not the Admiralty's 
only worry: the French ships were, class f~r class, superior 
to the -British in gun power, tonnage and speed. Then,· too 
. at least ten French ships mounted between · 100 and. 120 guns 
29 each while the largest British ships mounted only· ,100 guns • 
._. 
-~--·-·-- _____ , __ ._ .... However,· the Britisho ha~ som~ advantages. Their rate· of fire, . . 
0 
30 two r·ounds in three minutes, was superior to the French, . 
. 
. 31 h and the use of carronades, ·introduced in 1779, gave t e 
· 32 Bri tishic,,! tactical advantag.e •.... 
!-l On the other hand, the Revolution had severely crippled 
the French Navy which suffered from a lack of trained officers 
and seamen. Many officers had fled. At the trial of Louis XVI, 
for example, his prosecutor charged "You destroyed our navy: 
a vast number of that body emigrated; scarcely pUfficient were 
left to do port duty •••. 11 • 33 Then, too, early decrees of the 
Convention dissolved the.c9rps_of .trained gunners because they· 
29. J. Holland Rose, et al, eds., Growth of the New Empire, p.40 
30. C. W. Crawley, ed., War & Peace. in an Age of Upheaval, p. 83. 
31. Carronades were a particular type of cannon designed to kill or wound an enemy crew rather than harm the sails . . or rigging& 
32. Tactics refers to the individual means and rne·thods of commanders in battles; strategy refers to the higher prob-lem of having the right ship in the right place at the right timeo Thus, battles can show both good strategy and poor tactics or vice versa. 
33. Annual Register, 1792, p. 95. 
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·· seemed to be "privileged", also replaced Captains· with 
· men elected by the crews·o The consequent disappearance of 
discipline was inevitable, and. on th~ first· ·cruise of ·the 
... 
war, Admiral Mora.rd de Gaulle could not persuade uamore than 
fifty men to be on '·deck at one time". 34 The· boast of naval 
minister Jean Bon St. Andre. that France had "the most powerful _· 
navy in the world" was partly right, for its sheer :;;ize was 
. ...-, .... 
indeed formidable. With its minor responsibilities, it·ap-
. . peared even more formidable. -· But whether the reforms of .. the 
c~,nvention .had replaced the Navy with a collection of ships __ ... -~---
,-, .. :,/ 
remained to be seen. 
The problems of France notwithstanding,· Pitt's administra-
tion had in its early years substantially rebuilt the material 
strength of the Royal Navy. _ In additio:n., England possessed 
- ------ --- -- --- - --
,',. ·-~-· 
a large group of talented officers. Although Pitt reduced the 
strength of the Navy as the years of peace drew to_ a close, 
his earlier reforms left the Royal· Navy in a comparatively 
favorable position. 
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·34. This represented about one twelfth of his crew. C. W. Crawley, ed., War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval, p;.62. 
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" CHAPTER II: THE EARLY YEARS OF WAR,, . 1793-1.796 _ ... _ ... ·- \·-- .. ~·-;, 
Great Britain ·and France went to war- in February of 1793. ~~ . 
. : The immediate cause was Britain II s obj_ection to the French in-
vasion of the Scheldt River basin in The Netherlands. With ~· 
. ' 
-France in control of Holland, Antwerp became a "pistol" aimed 
·at England. 1 Pitt's first problem was to devise a strategy 
to defeat tbe French. 
,. 
'• 
.,.,. ,--Almost every prominent British citizen had his oWil pet 
·. project for defeating. the enemy. The Duke of Richmond, for~ 
example, urged an invasion of French naval bases such as 
Brest and Toulon, while Edmund Burke insisted that aid to 
J the Royalists in the Vende, was the best method. 2 Lord 
-
. -··-Auckland favored a prompt conquest of Paris because this··-
. would allow the.British to capture the French West Indian 
1 . 3 co onies. Both Dundas and Pitt favored capturing the French 
colonies, as the revenue thus gained could subsidize Cantin-
L. 
ental allies. 4 Then, to·o, there was the question of allies, 
whether the British should employ their army alongside their 
1. Michael Lewis, Histor,7 of the Royal Navy. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957, p. 1530 
2. Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946}, po 1790 
3. Je Holland Rose, e·t alo, edso, The Growth of the NewErn-pireo Vol,. II of The Cambrid e Histor of the British 
Empire.,. (Cambridge: Uni~lersity Press, 1940 , p., 480 
4. Herbert Richmond, Statesmen am.Sea Power, p. 175. 
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- -_ allies or in independent campaigns. Clearly, Britis~ stra-
tegy could no longer be simple anq. direct as in previous w,ars, 
for now Britain had to shield an ever-expanding Empire from 
·'\. 
. 
Bengal to Canada to Jamaica, as well as protect England and 
attack France and her colonies • 
. . .... .. 
Since William Pitt was i,r·imarily a peace ~itj.ister, ~f)t 
a military commander, .it is not surprising that he_ had problems 
drafting British strategy: 
'7 Th~ plans of the British government were 
of the vaguest. Should we concentrate for 
invasion on the French front? Or make sud-den attacks on the coast of France, where a 
counter-revolution might pe encouraged? Or 
turn our attention to the Fr'ench Islands in 
the West Ingies?S · 
Only Pitt could answer these questions, and in reaching 
his decisions he had very little help. Pitt's early adminis-
tration of the war was a chaotic affair. No one professional 
.decided war policy: three amateurs attempted to do so. For 
example, the Secretary of State at War was only responsible 
for equipment and supplies, nothing else, while another of-
., ficer, the Secretary of State for War, _theoretically had re-
sponsibility for war plans. This second office was held by 
Dundas and illustrates that the entire Cabinet contained not 
--------·--.~--· .. ·~----·e,-- ........... 
5. Edward Lascelles, The LifG of Charles James Foxe {London: Oxford University Press, 1936), po 2530 
6. Jo Seton-Watson, The Reign of George III: 1760-1815. (London: Clarendon Press, 1960}, p. 365. 
~: 
I 
l 
I 
l 
! 
.I 
'1 
I 
I 
I 
r 
l 
! 
I! 
I' 
I 
i 
! 
\ 
,; 
-· ·-----·--···-·-----.~-.-------' ---· .. -
- 19 -
. . 7 
one man ·in whom there was a. 08 flicker. of war. geni-us. 11 Al-
though Pitt. and.rChatham were both sons of. Britain° s· great 
minister, the First Lord Chatham, neither had inherited their 
father's talent for.waging ·war. 
Consequently, Pitt entrusted the direction of war policy 
··to Dtindas, though he had no particular _reason either t9 trust 
or doubt Dundas• judgment in this area •. Since Dundas had 
. . 
··-· .-.J----~-----··'" --· ·--·-··"'""'·--~-.-, -.,• -·-:--
·n~v~r failed him before, Pitt believed that the.conduct of the 
war was in the best possible hands. With the exception of 
occasional sound advice from the King, such as the co!lllllent 
that _"the misfortune of our situation is that we have too 
many objects to attend to, and our forces must co.nsequently 
be too weak at each place," Dundas toiled alone at plans and 
8 
· schemes~ Not surprisingly, Dundas failed Pitt by producing 
ti 
· only impul-s.ive and diffuse plans. . -- - . --- .. -· -· . - ~-: 
Pitt's failure to see the disadvantages of employing 
amateurs to perform professional tasks isJeasily explained. 
Many authorities, including Admiral Byam Martin, 9 expected a 
short war. ?-tiddleton, in a rare error, wrote to the First-
Lord six months later that the. war "does not seem to call r---.--,.•:• ·' 
:-~---- · ·· much for a continuance of employing the flower of our ships. 11 
\ 
7. J. Holland Rose et AJ.., eds., Growth of the New Empirb, p. 39 
8. IbidQ, Po 470 
9. ~Diary of Admiral Martin, June, 1793. Richard Vesey Hamil-
ton, ed .. ·, Letters and Pa ers of Admiral of the Fleet Thom-
as Byam Martin, I n.p.; Navy Records Society, 1903 181. 
' 
.. _•;, .... ·_ 
, I 
... 
. . Middleton went on. later in the month to·. advise 
' "~· 
~ . 10 how to demobilize the Navy. Pitt realized that the 
·. French Army was disorganized, that France was almost bankrupt 
and, at the moment, lacked leaders. 11 It was no wonder, then, 
that he anticipated a sho~t war, so short, in fact, that at 
-- .first he mcide no provision for increasing taxes~ 12 
-----~------- :--~------- . 
----·---,----------. -- - -
. 
----
- ... -~-- -·-- -.~ - - ---.--~--- -- . _______ ,_ -
.. . 
- .. - ,-. - -
... 
While the Prime Minister decided how to use the fleet, 
the Admiralty hastened to bring it up to wartime strength. 
- The fi~st problem was obtaining seamen. . Parliament voted to 
expand the Navy to 45,000 seamen, 13 but no Parliamentary de-
cree could produce these men. Seamen, neglected in peacetime, 
could not now be found in wartime. Most were already at sea 
on· ,the vast merchant fleets which were often away from England 
for years a.t a· time. -Unquestionably, the most critical proble~ 
was to find men for the waiting warships.· Although press war-
.·_ rants were issued in the second half of February 179.(3, the 
) - ..,...: ... -. 
complements of the Channel, Mediterranean and North Sea fleets 
- - --- -= • -,- ' - ' 
~ .  . 
' <) . 
were filled so slowl¥ that not until July 14, fully five months 
10. Middleton to Chatham, October, 1793. John Knox Laughton, Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham, Admiral of the Red Squadron 1758-1813, II (nopo; Navy Records Society, 1910) 353, 362n 
. 11. Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, p. 175. 
. ' 
. . ' 
12. William Hunt, The Histor of En land from the Accession of Geor e III to the Close of Pitt 0 s First Administration 1760-1801 o Volo X of The Political History of Englando don: Longrnans, Green and Coo, 1905), p. 347. 
13. Parliamentary History, XXX, 561. 
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. I 
after war was declared, was the Channel fleet,ready for sea • 
. ·As late as September O the Admiralty anxiously a.waited the 
East and West Indian convoys which would provi·de good hauls 
. 14 for the press gang. Collingwood•s ship was a typical case. 
He reported in May 1793, that: "The Prince has been eight weeks 
in commission and there·are not eight good seamen before the 
mast belonging.to her 11 • 15 Such poor results demonstrated that. 
- ______________ :_ ·-- - . 
--.--·------- ... ---·- - - . - -----. . 
:··· 
.. ·----,-·-------------- - --~ ~ 
the press gang was;not prepared to cope with any extensive 
' ' 
war requiring large numbers. of seamen. 
; . . ~ ---.. 
Meanwhile, commanders were appointed for th·e two main 
fleets. The Admiralty had an extraordinarily talented and ex-
' perienced list of available senior commanders. Foremost among 
them was Admiral Richard Lord Howe. He had entered the Navy 
... 
in 1739 at the age of 13 and had never left it. Although he 
enjoyed powerful interest, he also had a distinguished early 
•• r "-
~ career. In addition to serving in Parliament for twenty-five 
years, he had been a Sea Lord at the Admiralty, the commander 
· in chief in North America during the American war, and had -··~ fJ 
served as First Lord of the Admiralty f·rom 1 783 to 1 788. When 
the Nootka Sound crisis broke out in 1790, he was appointed to 
command the Channel fleet. He declined active duty from 1790 · 
,, 
· · 14. J. Holland Rose et al., eds., Growth of the Nei~ Empire, 
p. 39 0 
15. Collingv.rood to the Admiralty, ~1ay 5, 1793. Edward I-Iughes, 
edo, The Corres ondence cf Admil"'al Lord Collin wood. 
(n.p.; Navy Rec6rds Society, -1957 1 p. 37. 
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until the war broke out in 17930 16 Yet it is entirely pro-
per to conclude that Howe was, in 1793, 0 th·e first officer · / 
_· 17 in the world". ·· 
.. 
The Admiralty also enjoyed the services of the Hood 
brothers. ~amuel Viscount Hood's career closely. paralleled 
·- --· -
.-~··.--.. that of Lord Howe. ·Hood joined the navy while still a boy, 
~ ·--~---- -------- --· • -----·----"---;-·---.:-__~--- ---r-------------- . ----- . 
·- ............ .. 
- - ·-·-----;-:,--- --- -· ' - - - -
. \ . 
saw· ~ervice in America, was a member of ·Parliament, .and of 
the Board of Admiralty. Hood was conscious of his ·rank and 
its dignity, religio.us, conscientious -and industrious. His 
somewhat cool manner held his officers in awe of him. By 
1793, he was a m~mber of the Admiralty Board and.a Vice-
Admirai.18 
Hood's younger brother was Alexander Hood, 1·ater Viscount 
Bridport. Having gone to· sea at the age of 13 in 1740, he al-
so took part in many naval engagements. He was promoted to 
Rear-Admiral in 1780 and served under Lord Howe. Bridport 
16. 
17. 
18. 
• 
,.,_;, ZI. 
Richard, Earl Howe (1726-1799). Member of Parliament, 
1757-1782; promoted Rear-Admiral, 1770; Vice-Admiral and 
Commander-in-Chief, North America, 1775; promoted Admiral 
and Commander-in-Chief, Channel Fleet, 1782; First Lord 
1783-88, Commander-in-Chief, Channel Fleet, 1790. D.N.B. 
Arthur Bryant, Years of Endurance, p •. 107. 
Samuel Viscount Hood (1725-1816)~ Member of Parliament 
1784; promoted to Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief 
Portsmouth, 1788; member of Board of Admiralty 1788-
1793. D.N.B • 
• 
. . 
~ .· 
-- _:- -
----------
~ - . ' _, . 
~- ..... -. -... •.•-";'.L':.".:..:Z.·, -~·.::C .. ,' • .. - • •• • .-·•-·-•,. >~" •--•,,·O 
more cautious and reserved than his older brother,· 
Bridport also enjoyed a large private income while Hood had. 
· to live on his officer 11 s salary o By_ l 793, Bridport was a 
Vice-Admiral but without a ~urrent appointment: 19 
The last of the experienced.senior officers available to 
the Admiralty was Sir John Jervis (later Lord St. Vincent). 
,,, 
· He probably knew the Royal Navy better· than any other officer_,_ _ _____ _ 
-- --·-' -· ·_---. -··-·----··-:.-:.=-- ,_,. -~--~-~-.· .--· 
... 
------···-- .,:. ... -,.,.:,.·•·.-~·~·;·.- ·~-,-~---::.-~l-----,.•-- .. --~. -for he had entered it as an ordianry sailort,; at the age of· 13. 
\ 
' .. 
- - .- - . - . -
He spent his early career in West Indian and North American · 
waters. He departed on.a tour of Eruope in 1772 which lasted 
,,,,.,·-_," .. intermittently for t~ree years, during which time he taught 
himself to speak French, studied the Russian Navy while a 
visitor in St. Petersburg, and paused to study the Swedish 
and Danish navies on his way home. By 1784, he was elected 
to Parliament where he generally favored the Whig position. 
.... --· ------ ·-
·-· 
\ 
' 
. . 
,· 
After another appointment to the West Indies, he was promoted 
to Vice-Admiral on the eve of war in 1793. 20 
Thus the Admiralty had a list of outstanding officers 
., from which to choose its fleet commanders. Under the system 
,, 
used in 1 793, the Admi·ral ty Board recommended the Commanders 
to the First Lord, who then cleared them with the Cabinet. The 
19. Alexander Hood, Viscount Bridport (1727-1814). Promoted· to Rear-Acimiral, 1780; Vice-Admiral, 1787. DeN.Bo 
20. John Jervis, Earl of St. Vincent (1735-1823)0 
to Rear-Admiral, ~787; to Vice-Admiral, 17930 
• 
·' 
Promoted 
DoN.B. 
·- ,"_. ' ~ -. 
' . ' 
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final step was to submit the nominations to the King, who \ 
then formally appointed comma.ndersc Since . the premier post . · 
::.1 r ·, 
was Commander in·Chief of the Cnannel Fleet, and since Lord 
-· 
- -- - --· ' Howe had commanded it when it was l·ast ·mobilized in 1791, his 
nomi·nation for this post was automatic. Lord Bridport who 
had previously worked harmoniously with Lord Howe was appointed 
-.·---.. -
-~ · -~~· -- - as his second in command. The fact that Lord Bridport•s 
his selection. 
., 
., 
___ :.__:·. 
:\ -
Lord Hood was appointed to command the Mediterranean 
fleet, in part because of his personal merits, but in part 
because he sat on the Admiralty Board. Before sailing for 
the Mediterranean, however, Hood resigned from the Board in· 
order to devote his considerable talents to his ·new post. 
·-- .. -, .. . - .. -~ -· -
... ~ ... ,·-··· ... , ·---
- -· -~ 
.. ,,. 
Thus the British fleet was placed in experienced hands:·. 
at the beginning of the war. But the hands were none too 
steady. Howe was 67, Hood was 68, and Bridport was 66. Only 
Jervis was under 60, and only he was healthy. For the others, 
. 
sea duty meant an exchange of the comforts of their estates 
for the patriotic rigours of sea. But none complained, and 
all accepted the offered appointments. \i . 
. 
By the time the Admiralty finally provided enough men to 
sail the ships, orders had been drafted for each fleeto Lord 
, - ·· Howe was to protect England from French attacks as well as to 
harass French shipping. As a consequence of Pitt 8 s alliance 
\. 
. _, ... ,. 
. . 
' . ·.r 
--·-~ ...... ·---·J'-.•-,~----·-· "'". --- . • • --~.--,r_·.,-...-,.,.,_. --,--·.·· ·:·::· .. ··_·,-....-:c,1 ··~·\C'.";·-.:..~~::,.a.._-~-,-~-,-;.'<.·-~--.-'.,.· ---,·----~ .. -.-,,,, .•,< .. --?• ·......,._. ··f• a•;· -- ~_-,.,_,.-,,.- .... ·._ ;.,~---"~·-· • • 
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with Austria, the British sent a fleet under Lord Hood into 
· . 21 • 
--"-'·· -- · the Mediterranean to disrupt the -F-rench. ········ -···. 
In Lord Howe~s first year in the Channel he disrupted 
French shipping, but could not provoke a. major. battle·o At 
first 0 Howe only watched the French portso But when his 
.. ····.: . 
. -
· strenght ~oughly e9)/ua.lled the French, a point reached by mid-
.· ..... / 
su·mmer, an. engagement was poss.ible. Yet Howe found th·e · French 
course open to _him -- blockade~ 
However, . Howe. failed to blockade France for three reasons • 
. I' 
__ First,. rather than tie down his -ships, he cruised the Channel 
· to-protect trade against possible French raiders. This was 
I ---·--- •• ~ .... ,prudent deqision on his part, for French war strategy had 
b ·. . 22 · traditionally . een guerre de course, a war agai·nst trade. 
Second, Howe,- simply did not have enough ships to blockade 
effectively, principally because there were not enough men to · · 
fill all the ships assigned·to his fleet. 23 Third, and most 
important, Howe did not believe in blockade. Rather, he was 
"obsessed with the supreme importance of safeguarding his ships" 
21. J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War. (Lon-
don: Go Bell and Sons, 1914), Po 1430 
22. Michael Lewis, History of the British Navy, pQ 153. 
23 0 11 In short, tl1ere are a great many ships commissioned, and 
no prospec·t I see of manning any of thernu O Collingwood 
to Dro Alexander Carlyle, September 1, 17940 Edward 
Hughes, ed. , Corresponde.1.=c-e of Colling\vood, po 15 7 0 
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· . and not .. surprisingly.,-----the---T-reasury--,st-rongly- :supported--:~hi.s----------------·--·• _·_ -· -----~----:--"~--~------~ 
· views. 24 
Since the French harvests of 1791, 1792 and 1793 had been 
poor, a blockade of imported grain by Howe would have serious-
. 
. 
ly crippled France. 25 But Howe's decision to cruise rather 
. than blockade was probably correct~ To maintain a force of 
twelve ships in a blockading position at least twenty ships 
were required to permit provisioning,·watering~ and repairs. 26 
-~, .. 
· Howe simply di~ not have this force. 
·\-1 Howe s.p~n:t.:· the winter of 1793-94 int;:port, not wishing to. -
risk his ships in the rough weather. But when spring came, 
he resumed his Channel cruising. 
. - -- -- -. ------------- ---· -
' 
.. 
.. 
prised 32 sail of the line while Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse 
!\ 
commanded 26 sail of the line in Brest. 
As recent harvests had been po·or, Erance had purchased 
over one hundred shiploads of grain from Virginia, and the~e 
were due to arrive in France at the end of May or in early 
June. Realizing the critical nature of the cargo, Villaret 
/ 
-
resolved to meet the grain fleet at sea and convoy it past 
the roving Howe. Howe had been waiting for precisely this, 
and Villaret•s decision led to the Battle of the Glorious First 
of June. 
24 .. Arthur Bryant, Years of Endurance, p. 107. 
25Q Ao Wo Ward, edo, The French Revolution, pp. 455-56. 
26. Herbert Richmond, State~men and Sea Power, Po 172. 
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- -~"----~--~ .. ----------··-
. · - 26 -
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-···-----····--·-···-·--· 
---·--·-···--- -·"'·-· - •- .. 
Howe spotted Villa.ret almost as soon as he put to sea 
--- ---········ --- ·-- -------··----·- -~---·--·---~---·---- -· . ---
. - ------· -------------- .. - . - - ' - ------ - ·····--· ---·- - -···-·····-
.. ---------------------------· -- -- . - ·- -··· ·-· -- -- - ---
. ···-·-··---.. ---.. 
- - -····- ······· .. 
-- -- - . - -- . . ---· -------------····· . - - -----~------·------ --
__ _. ____ _;__~-·-·······-'· -----·--···· 
·and chased after him immediately._ Howe detached his fastest 
.;.,,,,.,.,,. ' ... 
·. 
. 
ships to attack the slowest of the enemy fleet, thus forcing 
Villaret to turn his lead ships back to rescue his stragglers. 
If Villaret was forced to retrace his steps often enough in 
this manner, the main British fleet could catch up to him. , 
· · Hood knew this as well as Villaret, -but only Villaret knew ,,. 
that he was leading both .fleets well out of the path·of the 
·' 
· __ crucial grain ships. 
_Howe spent the last three days of ~ay, 17~4, att~cking. 
Villaret•s tail, and finally offered battle on June 1. With 
both fleets in single files on opposite courses, Lhe classic 
,. ' 
,-·-- ----- ,-·-;...._-- - --
- - ---·~---
L .... ~~cc......----~----line of battle, Hood, __ qrdered each of his ships to suddenly ', ---- ---____ , _______ _ 
\ 
',, 
turn and pass between the French ships, so that each English 
ship would pass just behind the stern and just in front of the 
bow of the next French ship •. Hood crashed through from the 
windward to the leeward in order to prevent the French from •·•I.,. 
retiring without his permission. 27 These were excellent tac-
-~ 
-- -·--- ---··--··--·---
tics, and Hood thus engineered a real battle, not a mere skir-
·mish. 
The battle raged fiercely at close quarters, and the Brit-
ish triumphed. Yet victory was costly. As Collingwood recalled: 
27. Michael Lewis, History of the British Navy, p. 156. 
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.· "Our condition ·,did not admit of a furth~~-p~rs1.:1it.: . indeed, ........ _. -·----·-·····-.·c·· -----------··--·-··-··· ·--- ·----·'" ------------··--------------~-------· - '. - ---- --- ' 
. k . • f h h d . . • . d t O DI 28 to. ta. e possession o w at we· a got require · exer ion e 
.· 
-· 
. The victory was a great moral boost, ·the first naval victory 
of the war. The s·±:x: captured ships became instant tourist 
· attractions at the naval base.of Spithead, for they were an 
umb ·. 29 . :: c.:1111preC'.edented,.:l n · ,,er Of prizes. · ' ' ), -- ~'"''"''\'\ 
-
But the Glorious. First of June ·was at best only a mora·1 ~-
. · ···.···.- .. ,vi9to.ry. · The French fleet was. still. intact • British tac-· 
. . 
·· -·- ·-·::··· tics had been good, true, but their strategy was poor, for 
· the important grain fleet landed intact in France on June 6. 3o· 
.-• -. -·- . ·-· --- -- Meanwhile Hood in the Mediterranean also had an active 
Just as the French Atlantic fleet had taken refuge-in 
~ : .· 
... 
:-
time. 
- Brest, the French Mediterranean fleet had fled into Toulon. 
But shortly after Hood brought his 21 sail of the line to 
,,,.,.,,.,,..,,, ... ,.,.,,,h,••>r 
anchor off Toulon,· that city surrendered to him. The Tou-
. lonese feared famine, approaching Revolutionary armies, and 
.. the English disruption of their trade and sea-borne food sup-
·plies. Hood accepted-the surrender and agreed to hold the 
city in trust for Louis XVII. Hood asked Pitt for troops ) 
to hold the town. 
" ' 
28. Collingwood to Sir Edward Blackett, July 17, 17940 Ed-ward Hughes, edo, Correspondence of Collingv<1ood, Po 23. 
29. ~1ichael Le"tvis, edo , A Narr.ative of J:.1y Professional Ad-ventures: Sir William Henrv Dillon Vice-Admiral of the Red, I {London: Naval Recoi:-as· Soci~ty I 1953), 14 7 0 
. 30. A. W. Ward, ed., The French Revolutionp p. 470. 
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-_ This request put Pitt in: a quandary. He did not want to 
repeat the Flanders fiasco of putting in troops 0 getting no 
_______ -_ _ ____ ·· __________ support from his allies, and ingloriously having to _withdraw 
' 
.them later. Then, too, he had s.ent a number of troops and 
a small escort fleet to the West Indies, further reducing 
. ' 
his,--.a.lready inadequate army. Even if Pitt had wanted. to com-· 
mi t ·troops, he simply did not have them. . 
None of · these considerations made Hood• s position · more _ -~~-~ 
-- ----------- - - -- ·------------· ·-. - - -·-----·· ----. --- - -·- ---- .. - --- ----- ~~ --
------------___ _____,_ ___________ _ 
·.• 
comfortable. Hoo.d - was obliged to supply food for both Toulon 
, 
and his own force, as well as to resist the advancing Revolu-· 
tioaary armies attempting to retake the town. In addition, 
J:;;:..-,.,,. 
if?-
-
he had quarrels with his Spanish, Ne:~11·tan and Sardinian 
-r-- -
allies. Hood also had t,o endure• iri.decision from London. 
' 
When advancing French armies assured Toulon•s imminent fall 
in December 1793, Hood ordered the town evacuated. 
;..ffis last orders included burning the French warships. 
Spanish Admiral Langara demanded, as a point of honor, that 
his men share in this destruction. This task they bungled 
miserably. Of the French fleet of 31 sail of the line, fully 
. I· ~ ' 
- ·~ - • n • •• -., H•"'""" ,_,, • 
• • 
~ - ' . 11·survived, largely due to Spanish incompetence. 
Now unable to use Toulon for supplies arid repairs, Hood 
ordered a subordinate captain, Horatio Nelson, to take a small 
detachment and conquer a new base on Corsica. 31 
_31. A. W. Ward, ed., The French Revolution, pp. 457-59. 
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The loss of Toulon posed a serious problem.for ·Prime -f 
-- - ---- -~ ~- -- - ·- . 
--···-·-··----- _____ . Minister Pitt. Lack of r~sounding-----naval succes-s had.helped·----~~,~-;:·~---------~-.. ---· 
',,,_ 
. ti' 
increase the price.of grain_in England. In addition, the 
high cost of war forced Pitt to increase taxes drastically. 
To strengthen his government by enlisting more widespread 
. 
. 
support, Pi·tt invited the Portl·and Whigs . to join his Min-
istry. ·ae entrusted the Home Office to the Duke of Portland 
... -· ................ ·"-- -and the Secretary of State for War· to William Windham. 32 
• 
- ... 
,P 
. . 
---~-----·· -~ ·--- ------~-- ------~---_-:---·---· ·1.- -------. ·- ------~----~ --- ·------- . Had the war been more·· successful,. Pitt would have had 
fewer,or at least more pleasant problems. But in May 1794, 
the Dutch surrendered themselves and their fleet to Fr'ance. 
·In April, Prussia surrendered, and in J~ly, Spain made:peace. 
Indeed, from the Glorious First of June in 1794 until Feb-
ruary of 1797, almost-three whole years, the Royal Navy 
delivered not a single victory. 
Pitt moved to increase the e_ff ecti veness of the Navy. 
He sacked his brother John as First Lord of the Admiralty, 
but only bec·ause the adverse tide of the war necessitated a 
drastic change at the Admiralty in order to "infuse method 
· 33 .. and punctuality into the dispatch of business," two qual-
ities which had never been strong points in Chatham's char-
acter. As Collingwood complained: 
32. J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War, pp. 270-710 
33. J. Holland Rose., et al., eds., Growth of the New Em-
Ibid, p. 54. 
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••• when we see a.great fleet equipped, 
.superior in number, and possessed of more 
·skill than the enemy O and at the same time 
find your trade almost demolished, and the 
·_.-_..:){\ ___ · :· -- .. - - --4.,_,,--' 
~-- .. 
·· .. ports of the Enemy filled with your ships, 
it is very fair to conclude that the best 
possible use is not made of that great 
fleet •••• 34 - -- - ---······ --- . ·-··--·------- --·---.-_·· ···-- --~·------~-·- ---··--·---·-- .. 
Pitt. appointed· Lord Spencer to succeed Chatham. ___ ,.Spencer 
·- -- ·-- --·-·--- had already had ministerial experience, having· served as Lord 
' 
' 
- ;, " ,+ 
•' ,Of ··-.,. • .., 
Lieutenant for Irel·and and as ambassador extraordinary .to 
"f• . 
Austria. Al though once a -Whig, · he joined Pitt upon the exe----------~ 
cution of the French king and remained his warm supporter. 35 
, 11· .,, 
l 
' With his new position as First Lord, Spencer inherited 
... 
a wide variety of. -.serious problems. The first of these was 
the volatile Sea Lord, Sir Charles Middleton. Henry Dundas, 
who enjoyed a cordial relationship with Middleton, felt -· ----- ---·---
obliged to warn Spencer that: 
(Middleton) has very great official merits 
and talent but he is a little difficult to 
act with from an anxiety, I had almost said 
an irritability of temper, and.he requires 
to have a great deal of his own way of doing 
business in order to do it wel1.36 • 
34. Collingwood to Dr. Alexander Carlyle, October 18, 1794. 
.. ,,_. - ·- . 
Edward Hughes, ed., Correspondence of Collingivood, po 59. 
35. George John Spencer, second Earl Spencer (1758-1834). 
Appointed to the Privy Council, June 1794; appointed 
First Lord, December 1794; 
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Spencer therefore invited Middleton to bring to his 
attention any p:1;oblems he might have. This -simple invitation. 
unleashed a torrent.of-incredibly detailed memoranda from 
Middleton to Spencer. These covered every point from past 
-reforms already enacted to proposals for future reforms. 37 
· Middleton seemingly assumed .that Spencer-, although well 
intenti_oned a·nd industriou_s, was a typical civilian First 
Lo .. rd and ignorant of naval matters. While this may have 
been true, Middleton woefully underestimated the First Lord, 
as he would soon learn. ---~-- ,.. .--· , .. 6- ' 
_- -- - - ----- ·- -- ·-. -·--·, :-- _-- __ :· 
. Lor,d Hood had protested ever since the loss of Toulon that 
his fleet was too weak to control the Mediterranean,rand 
... ·-· ·) . 
that the Admiralty sent him only token reinforcements wh-i:le · 
greatly strengthening the Channel fleet. ~en Spencer sent 
him a new list of proposed reinforcements, Hood declared them 
insufficient and announced that with such puny·forces he 
ld . . t 38 cou not promise vie ory. 
- ------- .. ------------- _, __ 
• 
As a fleet commander, Hood was correct in frankly stating 
his position to the First Lord. But he went too far. Not 
only did his protests cast.do\IPts on Spencer's competence 
as First Lord, but some of his protests became public. From 
Spencer 0 s point of vie~, the issue was simple: either the 
37. See Ibid ppa 7-14, and Eassim~ 
38. Dorothy I-Iood, Admirals I-Io!::;d... (London: Hu·tchinson, n.d.), p.. 153 .. 
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.. 
First Lord or a fleet commander -ran the· Navy. · -Spencer• s 
decision was also simpl:e: he promptly cashiered Lord Hood. 
But in view of.the Admiral 0 s past record of service 0 Spencer 
.. 
announced that Hood was recalled due to poor health. The-
First. Lord's contidential · report to the King was more ex-----. 
. 
. 
plicit: he was 
-y 
. ,q· 
>--, 
••• fully persuaded that the discipline and. 
subordination · so necessary to be maintai.ned between the Board of Admiralty and the of-ficers entrusted by that Board with the con-
.·. ·",f .· 
'.' .•· ,:, It· ... ' 
. ....,--:-
- --~--,- - . - ·----.!...-.-·- ·- _-_;. 
.. duct of you~ Majesty 0 s naval forces would be 
entirely at an.end, if public and official 
representations of this kind we·re allowed 
.:. ·--· ,.,.·, ---.--- e•· _:_ ___ , .... ___, 
.. .:_, 
·---·-- ·----~ 
to pass unnoticea.39 
- . ---- -------- --·---'\. ··-·-
. '· 
_. l ' Following the recall of.Lord Hood, the command.of the 
· . 40 
---- -····Mediterranean fleet fell to Vice-Admiral William Hotham, 
~ '· . ' 
Hood's second in command. In allowing Hotham to take command,· 
Spencer committed one of the "gravest blunders of the war11 • 41 
Hotham was an adequate subordinate,· but·he lacked the decisive-
.. ness, force of character and energy required of.· a .commander 
in chief. As one of his colleagues described h·i-m: . 
• - . . •. ··-·· • ~ - - - •••• >,r-
- • ··---·-· • _, ---~~-.........~ - -·~ •• - .... ~ "' ---d - ·~- _ •• -...-.-· 
Admiral Hotham is a gentlemanly like man, 
and would ••• do his duty in a day of bat-· 
tleo But he is past the time of life for 
action; his soul has got do'Wil ·to his belly 
~ic) and never mounts highe~ now, and in 
... 
39. Spencer to the King, May 3, 17940 Julian S. Corbett, ed., Spencer Papers, I, 3le 
40. \villiam Hotham, Baron Hotham of South Dal ton ( 1732-18]~3). He had served during the American war, as had many of 
the flag officerso Promoted to Rear-Admiral 1787; Vice-Admiral 1790; Admiral_l795o DoNoBu 
- .. ~- ..... ~ 
.... . 
41. A.WO Ward, ed., French Revolution, p. 459. 
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· all business he is a\ piece of perfectly · · 
· .. ·.inert formalityo42./" 
·. Hotham • s record as commander in chief · demonstrates his 
.. . . ~· ... _ ...... , .. ·'" .- ~-~, 
inadequacy.,r 0 •• When the French sailed against ~orsica · in;i, March·. · 
179§ 11 . Hotham immediately engaged their fleete ,,~_But after 
taking only two prizes, Hotham ordered his. fleet to retire,· 
. and the French returned to Toulon. When Nelson protested .. · 
Botham's failure to continue the battle, Hotham replied: "We· 
· 43 must be content; we have done very well". Thus Hotham 
threw away one of the war•s-greatest opportunities of de-
: .. 
r>: 
_____________________ straying the French fleet. Hotham' s blunder was obvious~ even--------~· ---- - t: 
,-. 
t 
.. 
- =·--'-'"!I""-' . .:--· ...... -. 
--~~ . - .. - ' .... 
, . 
to the 
.. - , .......... 
ordinary seamen such as James Gardner: 
The Yankee historian44gives a very incorrect 
account of this (battle); ••• which appears 
strange, as this calumnator always felt hap-
py in finding fault with naval officers and 
here missed a good opportunity.45 , 
To make matters worse, Hotham did not learn from his error; 
r.ather, he repeated it on July · 13. To such hands had Spen-
cer entrusted the Mediterranean fleet. 
• 
Meanwhile, Spencer was also having difficulties with Lord 
42. 
43. 
449 
45 .. 
Sir Gilbert Elliot to William Windham, April 2, 1795. 
Lord Rosebery, edo, The Windham Papers: The Life and 
Corres ondence of the Tro Hono William Windham: 1750-
1810,· I Boston: Small, Maynard & Coo, 1913 294-5. 
Ao W .. Ward, edo, French Revolution, po 4590 
liilliam James, a contemporary naval historiano 
Richard Vesey Hamil ton and John l{nox Laughton ,i eds., 
Recollections of James Anthon Gardner Commander R.N. 
n. po; Navy Records Societ-Y, 1906 , p. 14 7. 
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Howe,0 commander of the Channel· fleet. Howe spent the winter 
- · -> of 1794=,95 ashore because of his poor heal tho During this 
-
- - ---
- - --- -- - -
\ 
· time, Lord Bridport .. commanded the Channel fleet under Howe• s. 
'.!' . 
, . 
nominal supervision. When.Lord Howe failed to inform the 
·Admiralty of whether he would return in the Spring of 1795, 
.J and when(~, ~t the same time, Bridpor·t requested that H(?we 
either retire altogether or return to the fleet ___ immediately, 
-- ~ ---·. ~---------- -~---- - ........ -- - .... . 
Spencer faced a serious problem. While Spencer had some 
· sympathy for Bridport• s position,\ he valued Howe too highly· 
... 
.J> 
to press him to a decision. Spencer and the King urg~d Howe ___ _ 
- - - - . -
w 
'' to retain nominal command until such time as he could return 
·'- ' to sea. Wishing to resign entirely, Howe yielded to the King's 
request and continued in. nominal command for-two more years. 46 
.. 
Meanwhile, Bridport ran the fle·et in his own fashion, which 
created ill-will between B·ridport and Howe, an ill-will which 
would have serious consequences in 1797. J, 
In addition to the Channel and Medi~erranean f~eets, 
.Spencer also had to deal with problems stemming from the West 
Indian expedition. From the earliest days of the war, British 
colonial interests, which enjoyed considerably support from 
Pitt and Dundas~ urged that the French West Indian colonies 
be conqueredo By November of 1793, most of these colonies 
,. 
had passed under British control, but within a year, powerful 
French reinforcements as well as native uprisings had almost 
k' '~ 
46. George III to Spencer, April 17, 1795; Spencer to George III, May 3, 1795. Julian 3. Corbett, edc, ,, Spencer Papers, pp. 30-32., 
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completely pushed· out the British. By the time Spe:ricer 
took office,; it was obvious that the British commander, 
Admiral John Laforey, 4 7 woul_d need ~trong reinforcements • 
. Accordingly, a powerful expedition to relieve Laforey 4 
· . ·waS---formed- under. the· command of Admiral Hugh Christian. 48 
' ' 
Spencer had .. selected Christian for this appointment because 
of his experience ·in the prompt organization·of diffuse for- ... 
·. . 49 
.ces. Since speed was essenti·al to save the West r·ndies, 
.c;hristian appeared an exc~llent choice. 
, •. , I -~.~ • 
···- -~-- ·····-- -- ~..... .-
- -·· --------· ---
----------···-·· .... -----· . 
But he_ was not • In assigning Christian.to relieve 
Laforey, Spencer opened a Pandora's box. Christian had been 
promoted to Rear-Admira_l only four months before while, at 
.. the same time, La£ orey had be·en promoted to the rank of Ad-
miral. Since Laforey•s error had been his failure to succeed 
against greatly superior forces, tradition denied Spencer 
the right to replace a full Admiral in an important position 
- .. ~ 
~------
. _.) ... with a very junior Rear-Admiral. 
I 
' . . 
' 
' 
. I 
- r·- ---.~ .... -·- - - - -.,. . ... -· .. -
. :"' 
...... 
-~, ~~ - -- - :.. ,-n . 
Further problems ~onnected with Christian's appointment 
were quickly pointed out to Spencer. If Christian were killed~~~-
50 or wounded, would command of the fleet revert to Laforey? 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
J,. 
\ 
Sir John Laforey (1729? - 1796). Promot~ to Rear-Ad-miral, 1789; Vice-Admiral, 1793; Admiral, June 1795) D.N.B. 
Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian (1747-1798). Christian had seen some service in vJes·t Indian and American \,va-ters and had served with Lord Howe. 
Spencer to Dundas, Octo 12. 1795. 
Spencer Papers, I, 167. 
Abercrombie (the commander of the 
ian) to Dundas, October 16, 1795. 
Julian S. Corbett, ed., 
troops assigned to Christ-
Ibid .. , p. 171. 
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·- ···--·----.-·--· ·-·· .. 
J ~~I 
Indeed,- . would Laforey remain in the · West Indies, _ fully __ -
aware that he was to exercise only nominal command while-
. - --· Christian actually gave· the orders? · To f_urther ·<complicate · · 
matters, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who had been offered the 
coinmand of Christian's troops, ·declined to accept until the 
- CCC c·,,~--CCCCC===·---C--•-•C. _ naval command was clarified~ 51 
. ' . .- --------,---- -----:--· ... : .. __ -: .... :::::::-:-~ . ..:_; ____ ~_:: .. _:;::; ..... :-:· -_- · .. -._ :. :,.-·:.... -- -:-·:;::·.;·:.- .. _.: -- ----- ··;:· - - .. ...:.· . ' .. - . 
·- ··.·'· ..,. -·-------~--------------.·-
----------·------
-.... . 
:::_-_·":_-:·: -_· -:·- .·· ---- ---- ------,-:--·:: :_---
Spencer• s. reply to a11 · these objections was t(? urge per-
sonal cooperation between Laforey and Christian. Laforey was 
.. 
urged to accept the fact that Christian was fully versed in 
the new plans as developed in London, while at the same time 
Christian was urged to treat Laforey with all d€e deference 
and respect. Yet in his letter to Dundas outlining this solu-
. . ~-. --~!. ., 
tion, Spe·ncer also _ introduced a constitutional question, for 
he wrote: 
You now have my sentiments on this sub-
ject, and as it now stands it must be de-
cided by the Cabinet, to whom on their 
first meeting I shall take the liberty of 
stating the subject of this letter.52 
Dundas replied very swiftly,, and inf armed Spencer that 
he believed the First Lord had three choices: to leave mat-
, ..... ~ 
________ ters as outlined in his letter, to appoint Laforey . to full 
I 
·command, or to send_out a third admiral who would outrank 
• both Laforey and Christian. Dundas also promised that what-~ 
··-··- . 
.. -·.---c··.- ever Spencer chose to do, Dundas would insist upon Sir Ralph 
51. Sir Ralph Abercrombie to Dundas, October 20, 1795. 
Ibid? , 1 79 
52. Ibido~ 175-76 
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· .l Abercrombie• s remaining in command of the troops for if 
Abercrombie declined, Dundas would simply 81 send him His 
Majesty 0 s Orders to proceed on the Service.n 53 . In the same 
_ letter, however, Dundas also took up the constitutional 
question: 
_ Your lordship t.~-lks of ( the command in the West Indies) being a matter for the Cabinet 
to decide upono Surely upon reconsideration you will not adhere to ~hat ideao It is a 
subject upon·which you cannot expect that 
any Cabinet Minister will give an opinion. The responsibility rests with you, and you\ 
must act upon it. 
' ' 
, __ - - -
' . 
Dundas went on to say that he had discussed the matter with 
' .I 
. ' Pitt and that the Prime Minister had agreed that the decision 
was Spencer's alone, but that Pitt woqld defend that decision 
whenever required to do so. 
Spencer realized the implications of Dundas• letter. 
Either the First Lord had sole and final responsibility for 
the Navy,\ or he shared it with either the Cabinet or the Board ' 
of Admiralty. To assign responsibility to the Board of Admir-
alty was to make the Navy independent of civilian control. 
-- ·- ~,.,. • .........-¢--,--.-----~ .. - -· 
' . 
.... ,j 
Spencer's sacking of Lord Hood had shown that naval officers, 
regardless.of their ranks, appointment, or personal prestige,· 
were not the ultimate naval authority. Nor could the Cabinet 
as a whole be r7sponsible for the Navy. No Minister could be 
expected to run his own department well if he also had to 
supervise another. Further, proper management of the Navy 
demanded that one voice be final. The Navy could not tolerate 
) 
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command. 
Spencer realized all of this as -_he· followed Dundas.;·:. -
·, sugg-estion to reconsider his statement. After first insisting • "!,. 
,.i.,~ . 
, I. ·._. • 
. -_. -:-::=:- - -.;_..,,. .;;..~~- .. 
- ·-.: '· ~ '-~ ;; , 
' .. 
' 
" 
- -
I 
-
' 
that he did not wish to "shi.,f t the smalles:t part "of responsi-
bility from myself" for the· appointment of Christian; he 
continued: 
I know I am responsibie for-the measufe and 
appointments ordered.by the Board of Admir-
alty, and if it were e~~r to happen that the ~ajority of the Cabinet should di~fer 
with me in opinion on any important point 
relating to such measures or appointments· 
,. wi thou(t. at the same time convincing me 
that their opinion was the right one, 1· know that there would be but one line for 
me to take.54 
Having thus settled the constit~tional question, Spencer 
returned to the problem of Mbrir•li Christian. -The First 
Lord decided the easiest sol~tion would be to recall Laforey. 
But, as so often when dealing with people, the simple solution 
\ is not always best. 
·" d 
Spencer's new difficulty came from Sir Charles Mid--
dleton. As a Sea Lord Middleton's signature was customarily 
appended to orders to an officer of Laforey•s rank. But 
Middleton was a personal friend of Laforey and held him in 
__ ., 
high.regard. Middleton informed Spencer that the only re a.son 
he co~ld see for the recall of Laforey was that he was getting 
.. older, and Middleton hinted that since the other fleets were 
· 54. Spencer to Dundas, October 22, 1795. Julian s. Corbett, ed., Spencer 8 s Papers, I, 179. 
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I 
· 'Commanded by .even older officers, this was entirely unjust. 55 
.. -·- ··- ·- ·~-- ,···,·-· -·· ··-·-·· ·---······-Cons equ en t l y, Middleton declined to sign the"'orders to Laforey 
but added that he would direct his assistant to prepare the 
orders. 56 
. Spencer,· who by this point must have been laboring under · 
severe strain, took great umbrage at Middleton's letter. The 
very officer who had been-writing Spencer intemperate memoran-
da for over a y~ar was now joining the ranks of the ~nsub--
• 
-
ordinate Admirals. Spencer, who had been reminded only·six 
days earlier that he was in sole command of the Navy, replied 
by a thinly veiled warning to Middleton to sign the orders or 
be fir~d~ ·- Middleton• s reply was characteristic: 
My Lord, -- No consideration will induee 
me to concur in what I think an ~njust 
measure, however recommended, because I 
know myself amenable to a much higher 
tribunal than any on eartho 
As your lordship seems to insinuate 
a removal frorn_office, I can only say 
that my seat is at your lordship's ser-
vice.57 ' 
Spencer replied on the same day by requesting that 
. ' 
Middleton turn over all his official papers to Admiral 
55. Middleton to Spencer, October 23, 1795. Ibid., 182 
56. Middleton to Spencer, October 24, 1795. John Knox Laugh-
ton, ed., Letters and Pa ers ofCharles Lord Barham Ad-
miral of the Red Squadron: 1758-1813, II London: Navy 
Records Society, 1910), 4219 
; 57. Middleton to Spencer, Octo 26, 1795. Julian S. Corbett 
ed~, Spencer Papers, I 1 183 .. The sources for this dis-
pute are remarkably complete. 1 See also John Knox Laugh-
ton, Barham Papers, II, 423 ff. and passim; III, p .. 6-9. 
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····· Profoundly shocked and deeply wounded by this 
-
_,- -~ ,- -···-·· -
- .· -·--·· ··-·;···< ..... ,-, .. -. 
-·-··=·-····-·-·-----·-~; --·-··· ---· ·-· -~· ---------- --
-··-·---------- .. shoddy treatment 0 Middleton wrote a full account of all that 
;had transpired and left the Admiralty, a misused and bitter 
r-.-. ~--
man. · M~anwhile, Admiral Laforey r·esigned his post, thuf 
clearing the ~ay for. Admiral Christian. 
\" ' 
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----~-11 ~. :{:!l,e ___ p~Q_Qlems ____ of ___ the_.Jfest ... Indian. expe~ tion were by - ·- ·-· ..... _____ , ___ ---·- .· -
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no means over. In late October 1795, the Duke of York as 
r commander in-chief of the army issued orders that henceforth, 
· soldiers serving o~ board ship or being transported by ship 
were no longer subject to naval discipline, but wou.ld at all 
times be subject only to army officer's ord~rs. 58 These new 
.regulations set off a storm of protest within the Navy. 
Lord Howe wrote to Spencer citing the exact laws which granted 
naval officers jurisdiction over soldiers wuile on board 
h . 59 sips. 
Indeed, one Admiral, William Cornwallis, wrote to Spen-
cer that until the order was revoked, he would decline to ac--
. 60 cept any appointments. This created a fresh problem for 
Spencer, because the First Lord had decided to send Cornwallis 
58. Although 
contents 
protesto 
191-219. 
no copy of the original order still exists, its are clear from the various Admirals' letters of See Julian S. Corbet·t, ed., Spencer Papers, I, 
59~ Howe to Sp~ncer, November 1, 1795. Ibid., p. 195, 
60. Cornwallis to the Admiralty, November 5, 1795. Ibid, p. 202 
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· · to supersede Christian. As Cornwallis outranked Christian 
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Spence~ thought this would solve his original problemo But 
Spencer informed Cornwall.is that although Siz: .. Ralph 
·Abercrombie had a copy of the Duke of York 0 s orders, he did_ 
;•· ... 
not intend to promulgate them. Spencer privately assured · 
·Cornwallis that he would exercise all the traditional powers 
of the commander-in-chief. ·cornwallis replied that in the 
,·event·· of the death of Abercrombie, .-his successor might- promul~ 
.. gate the new and offensive regulations. Spencer answered, in 
effect, that Cornwallis ought to forget the whole matter and 
prepare to sail as soon as possible • 
.... ,·· ..... 
Reluctantly, Cornwallis acquiesced. He sailed in his 
flagship on February 29, 1796, but returned a few days later 
when his flagship was damaged in a storm·. Thus an exasperated 
Spencer found Cornwallis was--~~still in England weeks after he 
had been ordered to proceed with haste to the West Indies. 
Spencer immediately sent Cornwallis orders to sail at once in 
the only available ship,. a mer--e frigate. In ordering an Ad-
. miral to take a frigate as his flagship, Spencer violated naval 
etiquette. Flag officers -- those holding the rank of Rear-
Admiral or above -- almost invariably had a large ship of 
the line as their flagship. Cornwallis took his orders to 
sail on a frigate as bo·th a personal insult and an affront to 
his dignity as a Vice-Admiral. He refused to sail. 
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The man who had fired Hood 0 Middleton, and Laforey would 
. not tolerate such conducto Spencer ordered Cor))wallis court-
·. martialledo The number of officers assembled to . try· Corn-
I • 
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wallis, more Admirals than had ever before sat on a single 
English cou~t-martialJ unanimouSl.y acquitted Cornwallis. 61 
Spencer was not)disappointed by· the acquittal. · · While he " -
held Cornwallis and hi·s· ·family in high regard, he f~lt his 
. position -as first Lord had to. be maintained. Since Cornwallis• 
refusal had been public, he felt it his duty to order the 
· 62 
court-martial. In any event, Cornwallis resigned soon after-
ward, and held no further command until after Spencer left 
-- -·---··· ------ ---·--~---~-
the Admiralty. 
Even while dealing with all the··west Indian problems, 
Spencer stil.l had to worry about the Channel an<f Mediterranean 
fleets. By September 1795, Spencer decided to accept Botham's 
resignation for ill heal th from the Mediterranean fleet. ._,_ ... - ... 
- ---- -4-- - -------
The problem was to select his successor from the two good 
candidates. The first was Sir John Jervis, who.had taken 
command in the West Indies when war broke out, but who had 
returned to England in poor health in 1794. By the winter 
of 1795, he was again able to accept an appointment. The 
other candidate was Adam Duncan. 63 For once, Spencer had no 
6lo Ibido, PPo 220-228 
I," 
ti· ' 
620 Spencer to Lord Cornwallis, not dated. Ibid., p. 229 
-- -.-
63. Adam Duncan, Viscount Dunc~n (1731-1804). A talented and 
experienced Scot. Promoted Rear-Admiral, 1787; Vice-Ad-
miral, 1793. 
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problems with rank:.both ·had been promoted ,to Admiral in the 
summer of 179·5 ~ Duncan in June and Jervis· in .July~ 
.... -;.·' ... ,,,:!'"- •,•; 
·· . __ Spencer• s choice between the two admirals was somewhat ! . 
i 
I 
·r,. ,, .. , 
eased by the fact that Duncan was already serving as commander-
in chief of the North Sea fleet. Since Russia was at this 
· ·· · point. allied with·· Bri tairi and the Russian fleet .was working 
_in close harmony wj. th Duncan, Spencer decided that Dun.can 
should retain the command~ ·Accordingly, Jervis was· appoin~ed 
.· .... 64 
to command the Mediterranean fleet. 
l 
. 
Jervis was a talented of~icer, "at once fighter, strate-
..a--,.-----------'----_· ---·----·-------·-·--······--···-------··-----····-··-·----65-------·---·-·----·--·-··· -·---·· ------- _:.__ ____ _ gist, leader and administrator", but he could not work mira-
---- ---
cles. Too many opportunities had already been missed. With .. 
France's conquest of Italy,· with a hostile Spain on his·only 
supply route, and without any base east of Gibraltar, Jervis 
evacuated the Mediterranean in December 1796. For the follow-
ing eighteen months, not one British ship sailed on that sea. _______________ _ 
This was thoroughly defective strategy, for Britain1s 160 
ships of the line easily outnumbered the combined forces of 
all her enemies. 66 . 
/ Nor was the Channel fleet ·accomplishing much. Indeed, 
·· only heavy seas prevented a French invasion of Ireland. In 
64. Spencer to the King, September 23, 1795. Julian s. Cor-
bett, edo, Spencer Papers, I, 54-550 
65. Micl1ael Le\vis, I-Iistoryo:f= tl1<2 British Nayy, p. 158._ 
66. A. W. Ward, ed., T11e Frepcl1 Revol11t~~on, 1 pp ... 460-61. f 
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~~,-December 1796, ·.the French sailed' from ·Brest ·but were ·spotted 
by · Pellew8 s frigates. . Bridport, wintering at Spi the ad 0. had 
1·ef t a supporting force fpr Pellew under Admir.al Colpoys, 
. . ' 
but Pellew could . not find him. V.eT¥ intelligently, Pellew 
sent word of the French sailing to Bridport insf.ead. But 
even as Bridport received the.news, so did the Admiralty, 
•· where a clerk failed to transmit sailing orders to Bridport. 
·When the orders finally arrived, Bridport•s fleet stumbled 
1:o sea;· ~he Sanspariel fouled.the Prince, the Formidable 
fouled the Ville de Paris and the Atlas ran aground; these 
accidents .delayed Bridport•s sailing until January 3, 1797. 
Meanwhile a series of similar accidents as well as rough seas 
prevented the French landings, although they sat off Bantry 
Bay unmolested from December 20 until January 6. They fin-
ally returned to France, and Bridport even failed to catch 
them on their way back. 67 
.. 
This surprisingly poor showing by Bridport•s fleet led 
to a lengthy debate in Parliament. The Earl of Albemarle 
demanded to know why no fleet was permanently stationed off 
Ireland, since Ireland was such a likely target. Then, too, 
he demanded to know why Bridport•s fleet was so weak that the 
loss of just five ships prevented him from getting to sea. 
Spencer replied that some of Bridport•s ships which had just 
returned from sea required reprovisioning. Further, although 
67. Dorothy Hood, The Admirals Hood, p. 173.1 
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. Pellew had_ report.ea .the French had s·ailed,_ he did no-t 
-where they had gonee · Therefore·, the Admiralty kept Bridport 
._ from sailing until they knew just · where to find the French • 
. ·These explanations failed to satisfy many members of 
Parliament. _S.pencer then threatened to resign if Parliament 
' 
.. _ordered an inquiry into -b1e state of the Navy. The· debate 
. - - - .. .:. - .. -: . -. - .,, -· . . . 
---
- ----'-,----r ----concluded when the House suppo:1:ted'Spencer by 74 to 14 votes. 68 
. , In conclusion~ much had been ·1earned in these first four 
years of war. While the Navy had won only one important vic-
tory, it had nonetheless protected England. Perhaps most 
important, Spencer had taken firm control of the Navy. He 
had learned that too loose an adherence to tradition some-
, ...... : 
- -
. times provoked serious dis~~~t_i11~-t~e __ Navy_,~_such __ as the-C0-l---
lingwood affai~. He would not repeat that mistake. He had 
. learned that th~ Navy could not conquer the whole world at 
-~ once, as the evacuation of the Mediterranean demonstrated. 
-·-··- - - -- ·- .. -. -
He would not repe~t that mistake. lo, .•. With interest, hope, and·· 
..r·-·_ 
.:.,~~-~;...:) 
. -· .:.-..:: ,. _;._ .. - ,,: ........ 
not a.little anxiety, England looked ahead to the new year • 
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68. Parliame~tary History. XXXIII, 111 ff. 
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CHAPTER III .. ' . 
THE BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 0 THE GREAT MUTINIES, AND THE BATTLE 
··, 
OF CAMP~DOWN 
-
'1-'he new year ·opened with the loud and prolo ged Battle -- - ------- --. -
of St. Vincent. 1 England faced the most seri<>q.~ qhallenge 
of the war in 1797, with a hostile Dutch navy to the north, · 
't' ~· •• 
a hostile French navy to the east, and a hostil~e Spanish 
navy~- to· the south. The Spanish wing advanced first. 
Admiral John Jervis cruised off the Atlantic coast of 
' 
Spain after his torced evacuation of the Mediterranean two .. __ _ 
months earlier. On February 13, his fleet of 15 ships of 
the line spotted the Spanish battle fleet of 25 ships of the·· 
.. .-· 
_______ u_· n_·e. . ... Undaunted __ b_y ___ his~n\llJle:c:ie_a_l ____ i_nferiori_ty, ___ cornmandi_ng_~----
captains of the high caliber of Collingwood and Troubridge, 
Jervis ordered his fleet to clear for action and form a 
• 
battle . line of two para11e1·. columns. 
,, 
By the next morning, Jervis was prepared for battle, 
but not his opponent, Admiral Don Jose de Cordova. The -~--------
Spanish-fleet was in two groups, one of 19 and one of 6 
ships. Jervis ordered his fleet to pass through the gap in 
the Spanish formation. As soon as the lead British ship 
passed through, her Captain was ordered to turn toward 
the larger Spanish group. Troubridge obeyed this order so 
1. So named for the nearest prominent point of land, Cape 
St. Vincento 
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-- promptly- it was-obvious he had anticipated.it, 
of the professional -excellence of -Jervis·• fleet. 
The H.M.S. Captain, coJlll1landed by Horatio Nelson, 2 .was 
one of the last···"ships to sail through the gap. Nelson realized 
that as soon as he ---passed, .the Spanish could close their ranks. 
To prevent· this, he ceased to follow the British ships but 
instead turned directly into the path of the Spanish flag-
ship. This bold maneuver~forced the Spaniard to stand and 
fight rath~~ than rescu·e· his tardy detachment. Collingwood 
and Troubridge quickly came to Nelson's aid, and the ensuing 
confusion unsettled the Spanish fleet until Jervis took his 
four prizes and retired. 
The Battle of St. Vincent was decisiv_e __ only __ b~~-au_se ____ o __ f ________ _ ---~------------------------ ------ ------ --- - --- ----1:..:.-1------------------- - -- - - --
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the actions of the Captain of the Captain. Since breaking 
away from his own line without orders was a court-martial 
offense, Nelson reported to Jervis on board the H.M.S. Victory 
not knowing whether he was to be congratulated or cashiered. 
--. Jervis, however, was delighted with the initiative and good 
judgement exercised by Nelson, values he had been attempting 
to inculcate in all his subordinates. 3 
2 • 
.. 3. 
-, 
Horatio Viscount Nelson (1758-1805). Although a young officer, Nelson had seen service in a North Pole expedi-tion and American waters before 17930 He was promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1797, fourteen days before news of the Battle of Sto Vincent reached Englando DeNoBo 
A. Wo Ward, edo, The French Revolutiono VIII 'df The 
,Cambridge Modern !1~story, (London: Macmillan Co., 1904) 453. 
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-· The battle ended th~ Spanish menace~ Moreover Jervis. . -
had shown the English could'win even when greatly ou~num-
bered, which·provided moral encouragement at homeo. Jervis-
was created Earl St. Vincent, and Nelson was ·given the Order_._ 
of the Bath. 
Whil-e the victory of St. Vincent -ended· the problem posed 
by the-Spanish-fleet, it had no effect on the new~st of Spe:n:.. 
----- ------- - -~------ --- ---- -If 
? r 
f 
!i 
.. t 
8 
t 
. - . -- ------------ ---.-. ..~--- > 
- ... ~ ----· ------ ··--·-· ------ ·-- ~·-·'"'\J ••••·• - ~ ._ ' 
. . ' 
. ·r-•·-··. .'!I' 
.., 
. . --- --~-- .... -- ---
cer•s problems. -·- ---~-- -- -----.-- ---·---- k Less than two _months after this victory, the -- ~ 
seamen of the Royal Navy staged the··--fir·s·t great sit-down strike I 
in history, a massive and crippling.mutiny. 
The long-suffering secll~en had valid grievances, not the 
,· . ,,.., 
~·· ........ ,.v,, .... ,'!J .. ~ ... 
least of which was their virtual imprisonment. Over half of 
a warship's crew was composed of impressed men. 4 Men would 
not volunteer because'· the Royal -Navy provided poor food, poor 
living conditions, harsh discipline, a liberal helpi~g of 
disease, indefinite enlistment, low wages and a real da~ger 
"' 
of death. The only compensation was patriotic glory, but 
few considered it an adequate counterbalance to the depriva-
I 
.1 
I 
---·-------
. ,. 
tions, especially when skilled seamen could enjoy much better 
/ 
conditions on a merchant ship. 
Since seamen would not volunteer and press gangs could 
not bring in enough men, the shortage of seamen became a 
4. Michael Lewis, ~he History of the British Navy, (London: 
George Allen and Unwin,1957), p. 167 . 
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· critical P.roblemo: As Collingwood n~ted, "Ships we h~ve, · 
plenty of good·ones,· but there is not one of us who does 
not feel 1weak for want of menou 5 Indeed, at one point, the 
6 ' · . Mediterranean fleet was shy 1400 men. In order to solve 
the manpower problem·the Admi;ralty persuaded Parliament to 
1· • ... pass the Quota·,Act.·-
..... :. 
The first Quota Act, passed in 1 79_5, = o:r;_g~~~4. each. county_.-
. ----·-··. --···-~--- ----~------- -- ----------~----------- --------· '":..;" _. ---·-· ' 
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act extended·the sys.tem.to the-towns. Thus London was to -,:, • ~-:... • + 
. --·-----~- - -·. . .. 
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-- .. p.roduce 5, 704 men, Dartmouth 394 me·n, Cambridgeshire 126 
men,. and so on until a total o-f--3-0--;-o·oo--was· · secured •. 
---,---- -·- ---- -· 
. 
· Enforcement of these acts was left to local Justices· of 
the Peace. Hard pressed to meet their quota, the Justices 
viewed the acts as a great opportunity to empty their jails-~ 
. 
. These forgerers, counterfeiters, smuggler~ and poachers 
_ ... ~ ... were sent to the Navy but brought with them intelligence~ ---r;o» 
,·. 
- ~--- - . - - ,------·-- ... 
education and powers of organization w~ich had never before 
existed in such quantity in a Royal Navy crew. 8 Fully 12 
per cent of the Roy'al Navy• s crews was composed of Quota men -
.by 1797, while another 50 per cent were forced there. by a 
9 press gang. Obviously, a majority of the Navy was serving ' .. ' .. ~· 
5. Collingwood to Caryle, March 20, 1795. Edward Hughes, ed., The Corres ondences of Admiral Lord Collin wood {n.p.; Navy Records Society, 1957, po 660 
. 
6. Ao vl" vlard, edo 11 The French Revolu·tion, p. 459. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Parliamentary History, XXXII, 414· ff. 
Michael Lewis, History of the Royal Navy, p. 164. 
Ibid .. , po 166. 
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against·· its will. 
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' Nor were these the· only grievances.· A seaman could be· · 
I' sentenced to 48 lashes without appeal. A court-martial could. 
impose 500 lashes which was a sentence of death ~Y tortu~e •. 
' 
A' man maimed in the King• s ~-service was· discharged wi.thout 
pay to beg his living, while married men rarely saw their 
.~ --------------···-·---. 
. 
' families. In addition, bread was so· infested by worms and 
insects that one consumer noted 11 You have to watch very 
·narrowly the bread you eat, or the inbabi tant animalcui·es 
will walk away, house and all on-their backs. 1119 
The seamen's greatest grievance also stemmed from Stu-
art times, as their last pay raise had been passed under 
Charles I in 1649. For the following one hundred and forty-~ 
· 11 eight years, seamen's pay remained fixed at 26 S bd. a month 
and even that was based on a month of 28 days. 12 Yet during 
that period, the cost of living had risen by 30 per cent, and 
army pay had been raised proportionally. Then, too, .seamen 
were paid so infrequently that by the end of 1796 they were 
.10. _James Dugan, The Great Mutiny. (New York: New American Library, 1967), p. 59. 
11. Geoffrey Callendar and Fo H~ Hinsley, The Naval Side of 
British .History: 1485-1945. (London: Christopher's, 
1952) I Po 18 7 e 
12. William Hunt, The History of .England from the Accession 
of Geor e III to the Close of Pitt's First Administration 
1760-1801 o Volo X of The Political History of Englanq (London: Longmans, GreeP- and Co., 1905), p. 391 • 
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the f·antastic of ~ 1,408,720 in back wages. 13 
ionably the seamen had valid g+ievanc.es. 
-Tl;l~ seamen first attempted to · obtain. redress of their 
grievances by lawful actions. A group of.them.addressed an 
. anonymous petition to Lord Howe in March of----1797, a. petitic;,n 
which· asked only for an increase in pay. Hardly able to 
. reply to an anonymous · 1etter, Howe pass~d it on to Lord 
Spencer. But Howe di<i·not inform Lord Bridport of the 
. ,.;a'? 
petition, yet it allegedly came from Bridport•s fleet. 14 
While thi·s failure was probably due to the ill-will between 
Bridport and Howe, ! t nonetheless deprived. Bridport of the · · 
opportunity to·head off the coming mutiny. Meanwhile, Spen-
cer ignored the petition. 15 Thus, the chance to appease the 
sailors had passed. 
In any event~ Bridport brought his fleet into Spithead 
on the last day of March. Each of his ships·received a 
smuggled copy of the petition prepared by a seaman named 
· 16 Valentine Joyce, a crewman of H.M.S. Royal George. This 
petition, also confined to the issue of wages, was circulated 
'"" 
with such silent success throughout Bridport•s fleet that 
·' 
.. it remained undetected by the officers until Maundy Thursday. · ·· -··---~-
• 
13. James Dugan, Great Mutiny, p. 35. 
.;--·-, 
14. Parliamentary History, XXXIII, 476. 
• 15. Annual Register, 1797. p. 220. 
• 16. James Dugan, The Great Mutiny, p. 65. i ·r • 
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Saturday., Bridport informed . t}i.e ·Admiralty that he 
believe his ships would return.to sea until the 
petition was answered • 
I, 
. Never one to .take ·suggestions easily, and alarmed by 
----------
- ---. reports of imminent Dutch attack, Spencer resolved_. to put 
- ··his main fleet between the Texel and the Thames.··, · On Easter - --- · 
- ------------ -- ---·· 
· Sunday, he ordere·d Bridport to sail. - Reluctantly and fear-
. 
·fully, Bridport passed the order to his ships. Not a sail· 
w:as set, not an anchor lifted.·- No longer a legal petition, 
' \ 
this was mutiny -- willful and massive disobedience to 
. .;,.._ 
.King•s officers. 
4 
·Informed. by return pos:t_ of- the-refusal-to sail and '),, .... ,... ~ 
. 
thoroughly alarme.d by further reports of an imminent Dutch 
a-ttack, Spencer repeated his order to sail with exactly the 
same results. 17 Spencer had become the chief of a navy that 
would not sail, of a fleet that removed itself from the line 
of defense just as· the enemy was believed approaching. 
Doubtless haunted by a vision of an,enemy_conquest of 
England, Spencer sought advice. But London was deserted for 
. the holidays. Pitt was in the country lamenting his just-
broken engagement with Eleanor Eden as well as attempting 
17. Annual Register, 1797. p. 221~ 
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recover his health. 18 ' . ..... . Parliament .·was in recess, and even 
the King was off hunting- in Windsor Parko Deprived of both 
counsel and critic;ism, but armed with the hard-won·knowledge 
· · ·· that he alone was responsible for the Navy, Spencer resolved. 
to go in person to Portsmouth to settle the matter. 
Spencer collected two of his Adm±ra·lty colleagues,. Rich-
. ard Pepper Arden and Rear-Admiral William Young and hurri.ed· 
dowri to Portsmouth at noon on Easter Tuesday. The First Lord 
immediately summoned.Admiral Peter Parker, the base commander, 
and Admiral Bridport, the fleet commander. By this time, 
~-.... a.-: new and enlarged petition had been submitted demanding 
better wages, fresh vegetables.in the diet, better treatment 
of the si.ck, wage provision of the wounded, and more. 19 
- .. _______________ ., ______ - - ... 
Spencer agreed·to recommend a pay raise if the seamen 
would immediately return to duty. But as the seamen had al-
ready broken 21 of the 36 Articles of War, over half of which 
provided the punishment of death, Joyce induced the mutineers 
to submit only when they had received a royal pardon, signed 
18. Pitt had been ill since January and took little part in this whole problem save to approve of Spencer's measures. 
. - -~-··---;· . ,, .. q .. ·i .,., 
, 
J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great ~~ar. (Lon-
--·-··==··-don: Go Bell and Sons, 1914), p. 3200 
• 
· ·19. Petition to the~ Admiralty, April 18, 1797. Annual Reg-
~ster, 1797. pp. 380-81 
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. - 20 King._ At thispoirtt, Admiral Sir Alan Gardner 
onboard the H.M.S. Queen Charlotte 0 where the mutineer 
leaders were meeting, and announced his personal solution:-
---------11 I' 11 hang every f:i.fth l\l;~ i~ th-e f1~~t.~121- This i~t~m;erate · ·· 
outburst made the seamen adamant in their insistence on a 
royal pardon as a sine qua non of their sailing. - The fleet 
sent a note announcing this to Spencer who had returned to 
Whitehall. 
Spencer sent this latest note to the Prime Minister who 
Hurried~y summoned the Cabinet. Chatham, Dundas, Grenville,_: 
Spencer and Pitt all .. recommende~ that King George issue the w ~ 
demanded pardon.~2 - -The King agreed, signed and promulgated 
the pardon. But by the last week of April, the Privy Council 
had still failed to send the pay raise bill to Parliament, 
largely because the Admiralty had not yet drafted it. 23 . 
\ ... 
Meanwhile, part of Bridport•~ fleet moved down river to 
- ----~--------~-,--st. Belen• s where it expected news of the pay raise bill --
- _' -- - - - -~ -· -
news that did not come. But the first day of May did bring 
-· 
_ ____,....,._....-- -~--~ ... -· 
20. James Dugan, The Great Mutiny, p. 109. 
21. Ibid. p. 110. 
' 22. Cabinet Minute, April 22, 1797. A. Aspenall, ed~, The Later Correspondence of Georqe __ ~1II. II ( Camb:riclge: University Press, 1963)P 564. 
23. .Parliamentary History, XXXIII, 493 ff. 
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fresh orders from the Admiralty ordering all officers to 
. insure proper obedience. ·These new orders coupled with 
intemperate speeches in Parliament24 made the seamen believe 
--------··----· 
. th.it_t;he __ Admiralty-was-- a-bout -to- reneg~rofi ___ ft~f-promises--~ and 
the.inutiny_broke out again on May 7 when the fleet refu~ed 
Bridport•s _prder to put to sea. 
'!tt 
At-this point Pitt asked Lord Howe to go down to the 
25 fleet and show them the royal pardon. . . The seamen had al-
---------
ways held Howe in high esteem and trusted him fully. Indeed; 
. -their first petition had been sent to him. Howe arrived in 
. Spithea¢1 and rowed alongside each warship, waving the original· · 
· pardon over his· head, allowing the ribbon and wax seals on it · 
to be visible to the decks of the· ships. The word of Lord 
Howe coupled with a ribbon blowing in the wind from the cer-
tificate was enough for the seamen and Bridport•s fleet 
accordingly obeyed orders to sail on May 17. 26 
Meanwhile an even more serious mutiny broke out in 
AdmiralcDuncan•s fleet .anchored at the Nore. On May 2, four 
of his ships sent their officers ashore and began a semi.:' blockade of London.27 This fleet elected delegates to a 
_...,._,_----··" 
. ·,- - ---- ,~-_....._.---·· -- - . -
24. J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and The Great War, p. 312. 
25 • Earl Spencer to the King, May 9, 1797. Correspondence of George III, II, 370. 
26. James Dugan, The Great Mutiny, p. 161. 
27. A. Ward, The French Revolution, p.-... 479 •. 
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"Parliament II. which elected Richard Parker as Presi:dent28 . 
and proceeded to draft extreme demands, including a revision 
of the Artic!es --of War and .regular leave for seamen~ 
.\ 
- - - -- -·· ··-· ····- ---· .. --
------·-·--·--------···· --·---------------------·-· --------. -----· . -----L-----------·. --
.' '* . 
----------··-·-----------·-···------- --·-·------·-···--·---i---- .. -- .--------------· ..... ---------------- ------·-- ... -- .----·-- --··--·-·····-- --
- . . . . . I The Admiralty could resist this mutiny more effectively ··· 
since the'--cbanpel fleet had returned to obedience. Spencer 
refused to accept these · demands, but declared he would par-. · 
don the Nore mutineers if they would return to obedience im-
mediately. The seamen refused his offer and opened fire on 
,.,:r:';::'.:; •. ,. .. · the fort at Sherness, moored their 26 ships across the river 
and blockaded London. When the Admiralty replied by cutting 
• off all their supplies, they ,·captured .ships heading upriver 
and confiscated their cargoes._ 
. ' 
The.Admiralty Board travelled to Sherness to negotiate 
but found the demands excessive. Conciliation failing, .they 
-------------·-· 
. ·,-,,_,., ~• , •:::,·.• • '< r 
.. ~ . ' --....... ----- -- '-' -~···-----. 
__ ...,====- - - -
turned to repression. Parliament passed a bill forbidding, 
.. ,., ._ ... 
all communi-cation with the fleet;· 15, 000 troops were collected 
on the river banks. In addition, the fort at Tilbery fired 
,..J 
on the repellious ships, and the beacons and buoys were re-
moved from the ri\Ter'-mouth. Finally, measures were taken to 
b t t th . 29 o s rue e passage upriver • 
28. 
I' 
.. 
29 .. 
... 
A Captain Dixon offered to assassinate Parker if Spencer felt this would help end the Mutiny. Spencer declined 
the offero See Julian S. Corbett, ed., Spencer Papers, 
II, 150-51. 
Pitt to.Spencer,. June 7, 1797. Ibid., 149. 
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e--~=-=c'---=~:~~~--------~---~-~---~-- ~---------___ : ___ ---- Tnus the -mutineers were -virtually· under seige. - They: 
- . . ., ..... ·---·· -- - ---· .. ·--· 
' C, 
-
- '' '-,, -,, -·- --
-- ' ' 
' 
-eou·ld not move downriver without· pilots which the new --1-aw-- _ 
··denied th~![l; they could obtain no supplies, for all shipping_ ~ 
' 
~-
' 
----------------------~-----'-----'--~-.--had-been hal~d, and -if they landed on shore,- :the troops - - -~-------~- · ---
, ' 
. 
' 
\ 
. . : . . 
. . .. -. '-· .. ,. __ . . - - -·-· .. ·- .. 
-,_ 
.. -would arrest th" • As a f in~l measure,. the Admiralty moved 
artillery into pla- to bombard the fleet. 30 
--- '~ 
-
- - ------·- - . -- -The spirited resis~ce by the government caused the mu-
tiny to collapse on June 1~ when Parker was arrested. Parker · 
and a Ilumber of Others . were ~~rt-~artialled and hanged, -w~ile 
' ., 
' ' ~ another group wa~ flogged roung t~e fleet, and nearly 200 men 
were imprisoned until pardoned lat~--by -the King. __ _ 
These mutinies raise a number of questions. Why.did 
the mutiny break out at this point rather than earlier or 
later? One important reason was that majorities in each crew 
were composed of imprisoned men with a sprinkling of educated 
leaders. The Act designed to end the manpower shortage had 
inadvertently brought on board men capable of both sailing 
and rebelling. 
\ 
Then, too, the mutineers were moderate. ---·-ll'hey did not 
d d d f fl · 31 b ah ha· · 1· eman an en o · ogg1ng,_ ut accepte ars 1sc1p ine 
- ~· .. ' ·--- ---
as a necessary aspect of life at sea. Further, the seamen 
almost invariably treated the officers with great respect --
even when ord~ring them off their own ships. One officer 
•,-,.,, ......... J,' 
30. Annual Register, 1797, p. 226. 
31. IbidQ, pp. 379-95. 
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asked: 
'How do you spare me? Did I not get 
· you flogged the other day~ m His answer 
was e:u=- 0 You dido' S_irQ. but I deserved it ....... --- . . ' . ' .•. 
-- ••.. Q 0 You . never ·p-unish~q -~~D .:t>].\.t ___ when _:they_ _________ ." ---~-·. --~--T-~-'~--/--"--:--:---.··-··-·-·-- ·· 
--. -----·-werEf at" ·fa.ult~: a.nd.-you __ gid it as an of- . . . 
· f icer ought to do G> 0 32 -- --. -- -- >c 
. --------~~~---~~.~ .. · -· Indeed, · the mutineers even fired salutes on the anniversary· .. :,--~.,_ __  
. 
of the restoration of Charles II on May 24 arid a~n on the .. 
King• s birthday, June 4. 33 · . 
I 
Another intex-esting question was who .was to blame for 
' -- __ J- -, 
. l 
-· --- -- ,_ ;(·-the mutiny? Some naval officers found fault wi·th Lord Howe: 
'.-It is impossible that Lord Howe can justify his- not having taken proper no-
tice of the memorials and petitions of 
the seamen which were sent to him, and _. 
which neglect was the sole cause of the 
great national calamity •••• 34 
Collingwood was too harsh on Lord Ho.we: his "neglect" 
of petitions which he reasoned might have ,all been written 
vby one "malixious individual.who-meant to insinuate the 
prevalence of a general discontent in the fleet" was hardly,_ 
~-~---··- the "sole cause" of the Mutiny. 35 
Collingwood more.accurately noted: 
Quite to the. _con.tr ary, 
.. 
, n 
32. Peter.Cullen's Journal, May 12, 1797. 
edo, Five Naval Journals: 1789-1817. 
Records Society, 1951), po 850 
H. G •. Thursfield, 
. ~ . 
_ • --,-_·- ~.,-.•. -.•.--,. __ c-_.-,.-.'"cc,.-.c-o,·_"C. .,- • • --
> 
I 
-
(London: Navy · .. ·.··~~,-~----
33. J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War, p. 314. 
34. Colling, .. 1ood to his sister, Aug G> 7, 1747. Edward Hughes, 
edo, Corres2ondence of Collingwood, p. 85. 
' ... ~ 
35. Parliamentary I-Iistory, XXXIII, 476. 
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How unwise in the offi<;:(?rs, or how 
impolite in the administration, that 
: 0 ---_---·-····-- • .cg.i.d not attend to, and redress the 
. --~----- ~-- fir-st· complaints -o-f grieva.nc~_! ~ ~36 
-- ....... ·- ----····,·--------
-. • •'••,--.• 00•". • ;; ·•· . • :• -"'•:•-:•:-:- •• ,.:\ •• - •• ,· • ..__._:_.•--
-· - -~__:: . 
. . ' .. •.· --
_ •. ____ · • __ - _____ ._· ___ _c ___ 
0
_The_ blame more -prop~rly belonged -to- all -the- -naval --o-f-ficers---~-------~~----"'-_ ·· ·------------
'\) -· . 
. ·- -
and Admiralty officials who had allowed such abominable 
·. - 37 conditions to ex1s~. 
t-...-'-----~-:.--~-----.:...._ 
--- -----,.._ ___ c_ ___ -·_ -"--¥et--i-n .. .,the ____ £ ace _of such. a massive demonstration of the 
_- -- ··-- ------------ -··· -·---- -~-- ... -- _. __ horrible conditions of seamen, it is ,amazing how few reforms- -
the Admiralty ~id enact. For example, not until 1806 was the 
·• 
seaman• s pay increased by a shilling a week; not until 1825 _____________ _ 
- ., ~-·- . 
did Parliament require a prompt payment of seamen: not. unti.l 
1860 were the Articles of War rendered less harsh. 38 
. Another good example is the case of H.M.S. Swinger. The 
crew of this ship informed the Admiralty that they would not 
accept their ne~ly appointed commander because his inability 
37. 
------------
There was nothing new about these poor conditions. Sam-
uel Johnson had written 38 years earlier that •No man will be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get hiiself 
.. 
into a jail;. for being in a ship is being in a jail, 
with the chance of being dro'tviledoooo A man in jail has more room, better food, and commonly better company.• In view of the Quota Acts, this observation is particu-larly appropriateo Boswell 0 s Life of Johnson, March 16, 
~ L"·~.._,,~- a ............ '•··,7---,._..,-,-~--;-"-~,___..,...... ~--•• - 17590 Oxford Dictionar of Quotations 2nd Edition ~~~ (Oxford: University Press, 1955, po 271. • • • " ... : .· .. :~.-- .. :::.'/":.::_. ·- .---, . .. .. 
38. James Dugan, The Great Mutiny, p. 430. 
. 
. , 
' 
. ·. 
. .. 
I ~ · ·"' - i 
J, . 
\ 
I, 
): 
1:1 ~ 
11 
ii 
~ 
jj 
I ii 
II 
11 
11 
I I 
~-=- ---'-
---· 
. ·.·~ 
- 60 -
. . "" to read or write might put them in danger. Instead of 
acknowled,ging this legitimate concern, the A~iralty replied. 
# 
that Swinger tvould accept tp.e n~w Captain simply because the . · 
J 
.- , ............... : . 
. -·------~----------.. :__ .... .. -........ -................................ ·- .... . . .... ------39·.. . ..... ·---·---·------ -------------·- ---·--····-------------------·--·----- ·--------·-·-·-·--- ..... -------- ..... ·- -- ---· ........ ------· ----- --- --------- --- - ___ , .... .,_.,.1 ---------- :·-----------------···----
. Admiralty so ordered. 
. .. ..,.-... , 
Indeed, the Admiralty enacted.so few·reforms that in the 
months following the mutinies, the seamen struck H.M.S. 
Sovereign, Saturn,, Bedford, Ardent, Grampus, Phoenix, and 
Calypso; half of these were rebelling for the second time. 
The Admiralty ended these with savage repression. 40 · 
-.._..... 
On the other hand, the Admiralty had good reason for 
. ---<·-·----· -·-,·, .......... ,- ---- ------~~-·· -··-----------~----
. 
ii- ·postponing some reforms. With the high cost of war, a great·· 
"' shortage. of _ specie, and very heavy taxes, E:ggland simply could 
not afford to spend more on the Navy. Yet other reforms, such 
' 
as regular leave or more mode~ate discipiine would have cost 
nothing. The Admiralty elected to do nothing. 41 
39. 
In any event, with the fleets once again obeying orders·, 
Admiral Keith to Lieutenant Pamp; June 21, 1797. Chris-
topher Lloyd, ed., The Keith Papers, II. (London: Naval 
Records Society, 1950), 24Q 
• 
40. 
41. 
James Dugan, The Great Mutiny, p. 426. 
.. .• - ,· - . - ·----""~-----
Michael Lewis holds the opinion that the mutiny •taught 
authority a badly-needed lession -- that the humble sail-
orman has his rights like anyone else, and that, ifrpushed· 
to far, he also has Ii.is remedies o a {A Histo.ry of the 
British Navy, po 85)0 I disagree. The continuing mu-
tinies as well as the lack of reform indicate the Admir-
alty learned little if anything. 
C • 
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- the· ·second of the three ___ enemy --wings -·could be challenged. 
·:;'·--";~'-:C"~,;i~~~,~---·->'~- ~- ,_. : . Accord.i~gly,' rei'nforcements were sent· to Admiral Duncan~ " 
. 
-
~::; 
,-!>i 
~'.} 
· two ships while blockading 16 sail of the line and 20 frigates. ii} 
~·:;_'., 
off the Dutch coaste For some time, he had commanded only 
~ . 
r·-~·-·········-·-, .... ._. 
. - f. 
. - ,--· -- _,..____ ~- -- . --·-- ---- . - ... - -- - .----···-· --- ····-···-··-·- -· - -· -···- ·----- -- - ... ---- .... ···--- . . .. - ' ... -- -------· --·----- ·---. ~-::·· 
----- --- - ----- --·-·-· -· -. - . - . --------- -------·· ------ - -- --------·-------------------------------·-,,¥ 
-· 
He had concealed his·weakness by constantly making flag_sig-
nals. The Dutch assumed- his signals were to a- large supporting 
fleet just over the hq_J;\i~on, and never realized he was signal--
ling an entirely ima9inary fleet. 42 Duncan's reinforced fleet 
-·:. " .. " ~--~;,,,,,- ,•- ---· ,. -
·-"·--··-----
suf ! ered _fromc- the. wearr·-and· te·ar of -~our uninterrupted ye'~s 
-- . - -- --
of - war.- Duncan ··compla~.l)~<i ... to _Spencer: l . . 
The Venerable cannot hold out a winter's 
cruise, r·am sure, for when it r~ins, even . -
in my c_al:)in I am not -dry, as is the case 
:-· .... -- -·;: : ~ - . with everybody in the shipo Indeed when 
she has much motion she cracks as if she 
would go to pieces. Little has been done 
to her for near four years •••• 43 
- ·- ·- -~ ------- . -· ··- -· 
• 
. -- .• ---=-- ... ~~'- ·-·--- ----·····--
-J -
The· Dutch sailed on October 9, and Duncan's 16 sail of 
the line met Admiral de Winter's equal force two~days later. 
Duncan approached the single Dutch li"rQ in column abreast, 
intending to attack all ships simultaneously. But Duncan's 
- . 
second order was more important. He ordered his fleet to . · 
. ' 
form between the Dutch and shore, thus insuring a decisive 
battle by cutting off· the Dutch line of retreat and forcing-
them to stand and fight. 44 In addition, this well chosen 
42. Michael Lewis, A History of the British Nayy, p. 160 • 
43. Duncan to,Spencer, August 7, 1797. Julian s. Corbett, 
ed .. , Spencer Papers, II, 189e 
44. Oliver Warner, Captains and Kings. (London: George Al-
len and Unwin, 1947), p. 110. 
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maneuver gave the British a tactical advantage, for the 
r~ugh,v seas gave the windward line difficulty in opening 
their ~ower gun ports, and Duncan had forced the Dutch. 
,-; ·- - ---·--· -- -·-·-·····---------------·-·----- ··-· ,,,,:,,c,_.:·;;____ 
-·-··- - ... --------- ·····---·-··--·--·-··-···-----"··--· .... --·.-.---.~-----. -------~--------·---··--·-·-·-'------------~--~-~------~::.~---:~ -co· the- windward. 6Ii -the- other hand, Duncan risked losing 
.,.; 
_;-:. 
his disabled ships on the shore, espe~ially in the strong 
l ' . . . . -
The British concentrated at first on.the rear of the 
_. ,-,Dutch line. ·· After victory there, the British moved up to 
I" , , 
' 
.. , -. ·...--.. -- ... -;, 
:, 
•--------·~---~-. - .----·--. 
.- ---Y~.-t~--:···.·y• .. ,·--_ .. , .• , .•••.. 
the ·center where_ Duncan's own ship was engaged. Indee·d 
' I 
Venerable was so heavily- hit that her pumps could barely 
contain the incoming water. But the arrival of British 
ships from th~ rear inclined the battle for the center to 
Duncan. By the end of the Battle of Camperdown, Duncan's 
excellent tactics had resulted in the capture or defeat of 
9 Dutch ships while only 7, and those badly damaged, escaped,. 1 
' 
By his excellent leadership, Duncan had earned a real 
and much needed victory. The Dutch threat of invasion was 
ended, and a great morale boost was obtained. Clearly, 
~ . ' ' Spencer's appointment of ,~uncan was one of Spencer's finest 
choices. 
.I(--·'- ..-- . 
·-----·-· ... 
Thus passed 1797, the year that had begun with the three-· 
pronged threat oftinvasion. Spencer's appointments had de-
feated two of these prongs. Further, Spencer had resolutely 
put dovm the greatest mutiny in British history. Finally, his 
I 
own appointments were now in command of every fleet, and he 
'I 
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-
was in full and undis·puted control of 
.·-,1. 
the· entire.Navy. Spen-
cer was now·free to concentrate on what ought to have been 
his first problem and was now his only • • remaining problem 
--
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CHAPTER IV 
THE-BATTLES OF THE NILE AND.COPENHAGEN.AND.THE PEACE. OF 'AMIENS 
In the spring of 1798 ,, . Pitt offered to subsidize Aus-
----'-----~-~-~--=~--c--~---~--:_: _______ ~-----,---tria_~against France·.-, But·-·Aus-tr:i.a. ___ made,· the new alli a.nc·e - .. . ·...... . ... ·_ . . --;,: 
. 
. . . 
.·., .. -.. 
.. . .. 
.... ~ 
" 
' ' ... ' . .•, .. _· . ' .. ' .· . '.. - . _.,. :". ·. ; ':,. . . ' - . .. ~ . .,.,,,~ ........ ,(;· 
conditional on ~he reentry of--the British fleet i:nto' the ·f" 
-Mediterranean because they hoped it wquld be able to harass 
· .· ·. the French in Italy: 1 Pitt asked Spencer if he could assemble 
a fleet. for this purpose. The First -Lord replied .I that al- : .. , 
J ' 
-
-------though .he cou'.l,d spare the-- ships, ~such a fleet would_-require 
i . 
' 
' 
.. at least. 6,000 more seamen "of which there is not the least 
~·-- . 
b . . 2' prospect"· of o ta1n1ng. ------, , ~-.. -._-.,· 
, 
·. By the end of April, Spencer was alarmed by the reports· 
of a powerful French force gathering at Toulon. · The only ____ _ 
British fleet that could possibly 'be moved to mask this force 
was St. Vincent's which was then;blockading Cadiz. Spencer 
ordered him either to detach part of his force to enter the 
Mediterranean or to move his entire fleet there. Spencer 
added: 
, I 
If you determine to send a detachment 
into the Mediterranean, I should think .. · · 
it unnecessary to·-iurge. to you the pro-
priety of putting it under the command 
of Sir Ho Nelson, whose acquaintance 
. ~" ... 
. . . 
1. Herbert Richmond, Sta~tesmen and Sea Power (Oxford: Clar-- ... -- .. --,-·-
2. 
endon Press, 1946), p. 1950 1 
Spencer to Pitt, April 6, 1798. Julian S. Corbett, ed., 
Private Pa ers of Gear e second Earl S encer: First 
Lord of the Admira~ty, 1794-1801. II n.pe; l\favy Records 
Society, 1913) 435-36. 
" 
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with that ·part of the worl·d, as 
well as his a.ctivi ty and dispositio·n, 
seem to qualify him in a peculiar man-
ner for that service.3 
---- ., • • --- • - - '• • --• • _.,.., __ ,- - -~~=·--.,--~-.-·-----,_ __ ,,.._•,M-r---_, 
. 
. . 
_________ -··- Yet:_ t:h:~ gr¢1.e:i:- J:9 .. c;:i:eat~L.t.his .. new_ fleet reflected -a---boJad.c----· 0--·~-----· 
·--··--· _ ........... , .. ", ."'. ,, .... ,. ....... ...... > ..... i_ni.t.i .. at.i.ve ..... by. ____ the--..F.irst ... '.Lo~d ...... si nee i t weak en ed the f 1 e et 
---- ·------- - ----- ----·-------- -·-----. -- -
.. 
.. 
·_blockading Cadiz. Thus _Spencer took the risk that .the Span-
··ish fleet might be able to attack St. Vincent, and move on 
to attack England. On the other hand, the new fleet would 
bring Austria into the war and might inflict. an important 
defeat on the French. Thus to transfer British power in this 
manner was a calculat~d but bold step. 
' ' ' 
I. . 
Giving command of this new fleet to Nelson was also an 
important step. Clearly, Nelson was St. Vincent's most q~al-
ified subordinate, but not his highest ranking subordinate. 
To appoint Nelson, Spencer passed over more senior Admirals 
such as Wil.liam Parker and John Orde. While \gpencer had the 
~uthority to appoint any officer he chose to command the 
fleet, a right he had firmly demonstrated by appointing 
Christian to the West Indian command, Spencer was ~onetheless 
aware that he was risking another round of protests from 
-----·the admirals. 
I, 
The protest followed swiftly. Indeed, Orde and Parker4 
_ _:_ ___ ·--~----------.- -· -
. ; 
. ' 
-.,· . ' .. 
.----· ' .-:~ - . 
,. ,. ·--__,.,._, ---=--· •"I-,.... - ..-._-_ .... -·. 
--·.-.=-,--~- .. :-,or-·.,.._ protested so loudly to St. Vincent that he ordered them to 
-
3. Spencer to St. Vincent, April 29, 1798. Ibid., p~ 439. 
4. Parker to Spencer, May 28; 1798& 
Private Papers of George, second 
of the Admiralty, 1794-1801, III 
Cit·~ty, 1924), 27 ff ... 
H. Wo Richmond, ed. I 
Earl Spencer: First Lord 
(n.p.; Navy Records So- .--;ccc=a=-;,:,:.~ 
I 
~= 
• • .•• -- 4, ~ :-.~~--.. -· ------ -- ...... · •.• ----· ~_,._ _____ • ___ _ 
.. 
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return to England. The sudden and unexplained arrival of 
the- two admirals in England-was a shock to Spencer 0 for Ste 
0 
Vincent had no authority to countermand an Admiralty·appoint-
• 
---------------------------~----_ _.--------------··-"····----ment. --------A-s·- one officer:· observed-:---------'· ------·----------~-- ----·- -- ------- ---- --- ·- -.------------·-·-···-···-- .... -- ·- --· ·'··-··--· -· ····-·-··-- __ .., '------------~- -·--·---~----·-· . '. --
- -· -·--·· -· -----------.~--... · ... -----:---' ' .. --~·---~·- ,-.------· 
The Admiralty, I find, have intensely 
disapproved of his sending Sir Jnoo·Orde 
home; it seemed to_ everybody an unwar=-
rantable stretch o·f power and I think the 
Admiralty cannot consider it other than - ---·-· '-·--.----·-.·----------- ··----·· ---·-----·-----··---·--- ·-----
-,------~--,,. ·- .·--·--·--- ·-
., ... ,- ;_. 
-·· -- -- -
.J • , •• 
;-. - . ', .. ,--- . . .... ,. - -· _. ----. -,. 
CL · ••• ,,~•._:.c ••. ,•• --,-,.-,-~- .•.• -,~c,,e -_, •• _-,.-.•·a• -c,•.- •• J,7 a·,,.__·.• •.···---~· • 
.... , -
a hardy.stroke at their authority in 
sending t~e officers of their appointment 
home ·to them without ev~n the slightest 
charge of misd_emeanour. 
· Howeyer, a little quiet' questioning by Spencer discov-
ered that Orde had not been sent home because of jealous.~. 
over Nelson's appointment: rather, the real reason was a 
fundamental -disagreement with St. Vi_ncent over discipline. 
The mutinous spirit of Spithead and the Nore had spread into 
' 
St. Vincent's fleet, where he quashed it with inflexible 
severity. For example, visits between ships were prohibited 
and overt acts were immediately punished 'by cairt -martial 
and subsequent hanging. Indeed, mutineers convicted on Sat-
urday night were hung on Sunday morning much against naval 
t d . . 6 ra 1t1on. ·It was against St. Vincent• s firm hand that Orde 
was really protesting. 
But whatever the reason, Orde's arrival in England posed 
5. Collingwood to Sir Edward Blackett, December 3, 17980 
Ed\vard I-Iugues·,-- ed. , The Co~respondence __ of .Admiral I.iord 
Collingwood (nop.; Navy Records Society, 1957), pp. 89-
90 .. 
6. St. Vincent to Spencer, July 9, 1797. Julian Se Corbett, 
ed., Spencer Papers, II, 410. 
• 
\ 
- - -=- - ---' -~·~==--=--= 
.. -- - .· . - ·- - ·, --- -'· ~ -- ... --, .. ___ .,., ... ~--. - -~- . 
-. _-:·.~- ·_. __ , _:_:: .'. •·· 
. . ' 
'6·7 
• ... -··--- : 
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·-_-_ a new· problem for· Spence_r. Clear~Y-,- Orde was insubQrdinate· 
·to Sto -Vincent 8 but so was Sto Vincent in sending him to 
SpencerQ Since St. Vincent was suppref:lsing what might have 
-- ---·- ----- -
-- - --- - -- - .. - --
.... - ····-····--·---· ..... ·--·--···-··· ·-··- ··-···· 
-··· -· --·-- ........ ·----- --····---·-"·. -- -·-····--· ··-··• .. - ___ ..... -............... ,...,.,._ .. -
. --···-··· -·--· -·· -· - -·-·-··--· . 
___________________ : _______________ _;_ _____ . . be·come··a:···inutiny under a milder officer, and since he was con-
ducting -the blockade of Cadiz with great success, Spencer 
' resolved mere-ly to send him a letter of reprimand. The First_· 
t 
Lord had learned to balance an officer's offense against the 
' 
value of his servic~, a vital lesson. Accordingly, the most 
· successful Admiral tbus __ far in~ ... the war retained his comm.and -
~-
- . of the Mediterranean fleet. 7 
While Spencer dealt with.the consequences of Nelson's 
appointment, Nelson himself organized his new squadron. St. 
Vincent generously gave him the best·ships in the Mediterranean 
fleet. With these 13 ships of the line, Nelson spent the months 
of June and July searching the entire Mediterranean for the 
Revolutionary Fleet. At the same time, the French had l~nded 
Napoleon's army in Egypt and then anchored in Aboukir Bay,a 
mouth of the Nile River. However, the French fleet was in 
.deplorable condit~on. 
To begin with, the ships themselves were in need of. 
.,.,,~.;--....c,.....-::;·.-;-...._-:c,_,_ -e-
: 
-! 
0 • ~--· N• ·-- ~------- --- • •• ~- .. -· •. 
•-·w 
.,_ . -------"' ~ '~ 
7. Although St. Vincent's fleet had long since left the 
Mediterranean ocean and not now in the Atlantic off 
Cadiz, it was still referred to as the 'Mediterranean 
fleet•. 
" . 
. t 
- .. 
':. ,.L ... ·=;~ ~_..__~-
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repair. -Cables, anchors, spars, and sails were worn out or 
of poor quality. Complicating this problem was-'Admiral-
________ : _____ · ........ _: ____ .~_--__ --- ___ - -_---~--L----~-----:~rYeY$.~.-: ... ---~~-t:.;-_~_I!l_~---~h<?:r;-t~g-~---- 9~---t:~;a..~.rJ~_g _____ ~~~-~_ep_; ____ D_Qt.. _______ 9:l1.J.Y ...... w~.~~--- __ .. _______________________ ,,, ____________ . _______ __ ! -- . 
• 
""""--·~-- ·-
. --~- -- . ."-~--· 
- -------~·-·-· 
---.- -•-'""'',' -··•·--·-=·"''" 
• 
. ,
his ships -- woefully undermanned, but his crews were so poorly 
t 
trained that they were unable to repair their defective equip-
-ment. To make matters worse, Napoleon took a number of seam.~!l _ 
- with- him to man the -boats operating in suppo~t of--the army · 
.on ·the Nile River. , 
" 
{=·· Brueys resolved· to fight at anchor· rather than· at sea. 
This decision was prompted by the-simple consideration that 
- -the French did not have eriough men to manage the sails and 
Thus/·he gambled on sacrificing 
Brueys ,~· strategy was to anchor 
almost two mile~ long hugging the 
He ordered his ships to anchor so 
close to the shore that if an enemy ship tried to pass between 
his ships and the:shore, they would run aground. Contrary to 
his orders, the French ships were ·far enough from the shore 
the guns at the same time. 
mo~ility to • firepower.· gain 
his ships • single line in a 
shoreline of Aboukir Bay. 
to allow the British to attack them on both sides. Brueys 
-noted this, but failed to correct it. Thus positioned, 
Brueys noted the approaching British fleet on the afternoon 
-, 
of iugust" 1. 8 
a. Annual Register,, 1798. pp. 76-79 
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Nelson hurried to attack· immedia~ely,, before the· French·. 
could recove~_from the ~urprise of his arrival@ But to do 
· so, .. Nelson was obliged to assume certain risks. For example, 
·-·· ·-··-----·-----···- ---- ...... --;-·-- . . ------···----,-·-·-------·- ·-- ·····-----···-··-· -·······-. --····-···-··. ------ . -· 
. _1 ____ . ______ ' .. 
\ 
. - ' - .:...._ .. -
' . 
. . . . 
the French contr9lled the forts protecting the Bay. Properly 
. ' 
managed,· · they alone m·igh t be able · to destroy the · British 
r, "·•. 
fleet. Then·, too, the anchored fleet was presumed to be 
. "° , , _,,, ........... ;... .. "":""""".;.. ....... l!t'll~ ...... ~1·~"'''"'''''''''''''"'''"'''"'''''''"' ,.,:,. ,.,,,. ·:, 
familiar with the ·local geography, to know wh.-ere the hi.dden · · 
.reefs, shoal water~,c and dangerous currents were located. 
Finally, the French could concentrate on firing the guns 
and not haye to devote a portion of 'their manpo~er to work-
- . 
·--'----'--,--------~--ing the ... hils. 
·--- --
j 
Yet Nelson was willing to · ·accept all of these hazards 
fl • 
because of an important_personal characteristic.·· He possessed 
a tremendous faith in the quali-ty of the British seaman. He 
seems to have believed that the British Navy was invincible, 
that sheer courage and determination could overcome all ob-
stacles. '\ 
Armed with this semi-mystical belief, Nelson risked much 
to gain much. With only a r9ugh pencil sketch of the waters 
of the Bay, he ordered his fleet te attack. 9 As the first 
British ship approached, her commander, Captain Foley, saw 
that he would have enough space to pass between the single 
9. W. !v1. James, Influence of Sea Power on the His tor of the 
British People. Cambridge: University Press, 1948 p. 20 
--
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_v,o \ line of French ships and the beach. Sin~e the French ves-
sels probably expected him to attack on the other side 0 Foley 
'\_ 
' . ' decided to surprise them.by attacking on the la~dward sidee 
. ~ . 
. r 
· · ·· .. · ·· · .. · · .. · ... ·· ·.· ... · · mhe Br . .;_t;s·h s·h-i-ps ·beh1.· nd·"··Fol·ey· ·--··£. orme·d-··two·-··:·o· ·u·t·s·1··de~. ···l· ·1· ·n··e·s····of········"-·····-·-------..,--------.. --=---:~ .... _. -·-·--· ... ··-------··----·--:--------·--------------------·· --"--------··--.i.- .. . ------- - -----~-- ---~-- ,' ..... ,,.,- .. -- ~- -- -------- . , .. -- ·. _- - . ' . . . 
·· .. -.· . ..,.. 
·. 
. · .. -~. · .. · .. ··_.· 
~. • 
• l 
-
. • :- . 
. ' 
. .· .... 
• ·· · · ··-. -- : ··· sh.ips with the anchored · French forming the third · and nter · · · 
. ' ... ' 
line.· 
. . 
........ ,·\'",,- ·~ .... 
French ha·stened- to correct their· grevious error. They had-
. ' 
been so-confident of attack on only one side they had not 
bothered to. load and run out t}:le guns on the other side. 
t-
... 
: - . 
-·---- _---------·~--------_But the French were not cowards; r·e·coverimgr from, their. initial 
i 
-
surprise, they offered the most spirited resistance of any 
battle in this war. ·Al though Nelson was wounded early in 
the battle, almost at the same time that·Brueys was killed, 
the fight raged all afternoon, off .and on throughout the . 
' 
· night, and well beyond dawn of the next day. By the end of 
. • J 
). 
the carnage, only two French ships survived, a remarkable 
~ .. British victory. 10 
" ~- ,,_. ----.. --.-··-- ____ r ___ • 
- -·- ·r _. 
..... . "' .~.J ',.. ..... , 
The destruction of the French at the Nile was due to .· 
.the singular ability of Admiral Horatio Nelson. This young. 
commander had refused to be bound by the naval tradition 
against attacking a superior force anchored in a faovrable 
positiono Then, too, his orders to his fleet had been broad 
... 10. Parliamentary I-Ii~tory, XXXIII, 1559. · 
.. 
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enough to permit Foley to take. advantage 'of his opporturii ty . 
~f ·-- .• 
~-
to -attack from the side. Unquestionably, the appointment 
of Nelson wa~ one of - Spencer•·s firtest decisions. . " 
• • • • • "\ -~ • 'I 
·:.::~~·.-: ·:.~·:~··.'..:.~----~- ···--- ---·····-·------~----···------------···-----· --·-.-----~·- .. -·---~---- -. --_--- •.• • ••. ·_ - •• ·_ •• ' • • _.- ··--' '-•----. ·--------···-
. . .... . ' - . ·•_ - ._ '. '. ·-·---· --~ ' ·-·- ·------~-----------··--·-------------~--·- .·······--·----·--·--..Lo. ... ··-·----· ---- '-· .. ·-------------·. -.. -----------·-·-----·----- ·---··----·· ···-··--·-···-~· -·-- ·----------··--· _____ : ..... --
·The. results of the Battle of the Nile were a great 
. 
. 
------- ··.,:~-~boon-~ for Great Britain. British power was ·restored in the 
' 
. , .... -. \ . ~ 
-' Mediterranean, Turkey enter~d the war- against France, Russia 
- --·-- ··-- - ·_··declared war o·n France, _and- .a Turko ..... Russian fleet harassed 
·----~--------·---- --------·--, - ------ .• ----- ·--·------------~ 
---------
- 11 the French near Corfu. \ 
Then,! too, the British were able to·use. their naval pow-
·-· 9-, . 
· - --If t 0 ~ - er to further cripple· the plans -of Bonapart in Egypt. With 
. ·-· " ' 
.. -. '' 
i ' i,: .. ·J' 
. ,.. 
.. 
-. no navy to evacuate his army, Bonapart began to march over-
a 
land through Palestine on his way to Turkey. ·However, he 
· would have to reduce the fort of Acre blocking his path. He 
sent a seige train ahead- by sea to bombard Acre but sending·, 
it by_ sea was his mis~ake. A British cruiser captured the 
train, escorted it to Acre, and-with supreme irony, installed 
those very guns on the wal-ls of Acre, thus \using_ French guns 
to hold back the French army. With the help of his ships, 
' · -H.M. s. Theseus and Tiger, Smith was able to keep the army 
................ 
• .> 
taarooned. 12 
' 
.. 
On the other hand, the Channel fleet was having less 
11. Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, p. 198. 
12. Annual Register« 1798. 151, ff. 
' 
.. - - -
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~· -, . 
-~ ,,. . 
~success. In August 1798, the French invaded Ireland with an 
army of 1100 meno Al, though 'Bridport O s fleet should ha.°'te cap-
tured the French, with his t1..~1.1a1· bad luck, Bridport completely 
·-------------------··'---'-·-.....:.·-------_-----'c---~·cc--~----mi_s_aed .... theme- .. The -Freneh -were -only stopped by· the·a.rmy ··at· 
· · _. ... -__ . Ballinamuch in Ireland. · · A · second French attempt to ·land was 
prevented by a detachment of Bridport•s fleet off"Tory Island. 13 
Since Bridport boasted "The Fre,ch might come as they would; 
--------~---......c.-
. 14 I can only say they cannot· come by water, 11 and since this 
\ ' . . 
.. ' 
,·.--
- .. --
. .,.. 
-~ -.-,• ·-:..,-, ,.,-- - . -
.. -.-~-- __ _, __ _ 
--,--··----~ -·- aroused-about Bridport•s fitness for command • - .- - .. . . j . . . But for the 
-----~ - -·-- - - -· . ~------.~----. -- - . -- .,,.  ......----. -
-. -
- ~ .... 
. ~!' .. ' .'I/I' - . J 
. • .. ·- •.• -····· · . 
. -- -· ----- .- . 
time being, no action was taken to remove him. 
. 
---- -
---·----- -
_;_J-
- - -----
--
---------· --
--~--------··---------
-
------------ - --
' I ! 
The French spent the winter· of 1 798-1799 repairing their 
fleet at Brest, planning to use it to rescue the army still 
in Egypt. In April 1799, Admiral Bruix sailed from Brest with 
-24 sai·l of the· 1ine. Only Bridport• s fleet was strong enough 
to stqef him, b~usu~l, Bridport was elsewhere. This time 
- --~·-=~ he had fallen back so as to be better able to protect !rel and 
- ... 
from invasion. Bridport never realized that the best defense 
for all British territories was a close blockade of the French 
........................... 
:i 
' • > 
' 
. ·, 
. • : •• , ''1 .. , ··-· -- -- ·----····--··-·"' ____ ., ... --· -··-- ----,-~-- .. ports •. - ----- ~ - --·- --- -- - . - -- ~ . - - . . .- --~ - ·- .. - . -- - -- --- - ·- _ ..... -- .. 
" 
' Bruix· took ·his·· fleet into the Medi terrane-an, forcing· 
"-""-l 
~\ the small British units there to run before him. But aware 
13. Ibid.. 150 
• 
- ----·~ -··- - - . -
14. Dorothy Hood, The Admirals Hood, (London: Hutchinson, n.d~) p. 189 .. 
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-of his own ill-trained crews, defective ships and poor sup-
plies 0 and also aware that a powerful British force was bound 
to pursue him 0 Bruix £?·a.i_l-ed into Toulon. . After a brief stay 
, 
- ·_ -, -. - -· -_--· -----~--------·---t•--h_ -e-r---e- --- ---h--e- -· .,,..-e-t----_u---r-ne·d-- --t-o- ----t--h-e ----A-t--1-an--+-_:-i c- -- ----------J---· o--· ;_n·-ed------c-o·· ·mp-an-·y--------w1.-·- -t-·h------- -a--- -- ------------------------___ .:..,...;. ___ ~-~--·--~-~------ --- ----- ------ - -· .. -- ----,-~--- -------- . IJ .--. - ~. I ".'-
- . ·. - -- . - - -
..-: . 
' 
Spanish fleet of 18. sail of the line, and retired -into B·rest 
again. 15 His brief sojourn had done nothing except thoroughly 
,_ 
frighten the.British Admiralty. _-
-c--~--~~~~--~~-=~-~~-..,=,··c-~~~~~~-7~::'~;.=-~'': .. But the fright set off an important round -of Admiral~y -
'"'•·~•-•--•-•-"· -- • 
-- -
... ·-----p.romotions a:n.d transfers. Spencer finally chos·e to acknow-
.. 
------'··-:·-:..~~,__:;~ .. :::--·:----'-·_ -~~-,_--:;..;....:·. __ :;..:..:.·-:--'-'--'-"--•-·-· -
.,..,:-
ledge Bridport•s incessant complaints of ill health and in 
-- April of 1800 replaced him with St. Vincent. The new -command-- -
er•s first move was to order a close blockade of Brest and 
the other Atlantic bases. Indeed, St. Vincent institu~ed · 
the f·irst effective blockade, of Brest. 16 Thus, 'the main 
effect of Bruix•s raid was to put one of the best British com-
. : -- . ") -
' 
---.-----
' 
---~anders in command of the most important fleet. Yet this im-
lr·· 
'- . 
-· portant change did not take place until the seventh year of 
the war. 
• • ,.:, .... - ...... ,-· C ... .---.------·---. -
- •• ~ After the appoiritment of St. Vincent, another full year 
passed before the last naval battle of the war. The engagement 
was a direct result of the formation of the League of Armed 
\~-Ao vl ~ t1ard, et al, eds o , The French Revolu>tion, Volo VIII 
of The C~mbridg~ ~odern ~istoryo (London: Macmillan Co., 1904) ,, p.. 630.. 
-
. . 
16. 1"1ichael Lewis, History. of the British Navy. {London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 1680 
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_ ·Neu.traiity. As both France and Englan~~ were in need. of 
. -' l\ 
is, 
.. naval stores such as tar, rope, _canvass and masts, the Scan-
dinavian countries who controlled the bulk of the world 
······----·-----· ·····-----· ---·······---·-··-·············--- - - -··-- --- -·- -·- - -· -------- ---,.-·----- - ~ ----.--~. ------------------ .... -..-----. 
---~"····-·-··-c··~.C-.~::__i_~-~~----'-,-------~----supply-·-·· were···.··· in·· ··arr··· a ttr~icti ve··· ·busi ne S S po si ti On. By selling 
. ·.i 
to both sides, they cquld rai·se"-prices and make huge. profits. 
- --------- -------- -- -
Late in 1800, Prussia, ·Russia, Denmark and Sweden announced 
i;;, 
· - -that -since they were neutral in the war,· they could sell to • ·,C .. -..:. ~·----~>a.-'-:',.o-•.-•--=-,,; • .• • -. -, a. 
either side. They announced belief in the principle of "Free 
- -_ ships, free goods~ 111 7 and · formed the League of Armed Neutral·-
- i ty to defend this principle. . 
' -- •----'--·- ..;, ... ·:.,_ __ , ____ , ___ -
I 
-----~--------.--.,---~----..-'---~~~~-1 ------------~~-- This Leagu·e---createcra--cn--e-ical problem for the Royal _ 1 
---~----
-·jj ·. ----, .-.. -·- ' ... 
· N.avy. The Admiralty advised the Ministry that any interf·erence . 
in the supply of these stores- would have the --3gravest conse-
qllences. · On the other hand, the combined navies of these -- -----------
powers totaled 123 ships.of the line and hundreds of smaller 
vessels. - But these vessels were scattered all· over northern 
Europe, and were not likely to fight effectively together. 
The Admiralty estimated that an energetically led force of 15 
British warships could defeat the Northern powers. Grenville 
realized that the British would have to fight, even against 
~.-, ..... ,.. =-·,.,.- . 
such seemingly large odds: 
... 
•,- ·> - --• •., -- __ ., :_,. ~-,-----···,- - .~~: _- .,· " Cl -.;.·.-•: -~ - • -
If we give way to (the Northern Powers) 
we may as well disarm ourselves at once, 
and determine to cede without further 
contest all that we have taken as a 
17. Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, p. 209 • 
• ,i. 
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-counterbalance to the- continental 
- . -· -···' -- -
_acquisitions of France O for such you 
may rely- upon it will be the tendency -
of their plan of peaceo 18 - . 
- - - - -
- - - - - -- -- -
- - ----- --- --
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• • <:;,. 
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-
acquiesce. The Ministry ordered a fleet to the Bal ti:c under 
----- ------ --
- . -~ - -
Admiral Sir Hyde Parker.with Nelson as -his-second in command. 
-- - ';' .· - -· '. . . . • - . --i ___ - .. - - --- . 
, 
· Nelson was -ordered to lead a detachment of the British 
- ,,,.- -
• 
fleet into Copenhagen on ·April _ 1·, 1801. _ . The Danish fleet was 
anchored and unri-gged; it- could no.t sail -out to fight. Nor . · , 
did it have to, for-the Danes had taken many of the ships• 
guns and lined them along the beach so that Nelso~•s ships 
,,. 
would have to run:9:;a gauntlet of intense fire. Thi.s arrange-
- -----
----,;;,·----- ---- -
ment -of cannon pl.us the twisting -and unmarked chatrn'.el through 
the shallow water made Copenhagen seem impregnable. 
At_least one man was convinced Copenhagen could be con-
quered -- Horatio Nelson. Undaunted bY~-· the '\powerful defensive 
preparations, he sailed boldly into the bay. His fleet was 
so badly battered at first t};lat Parker hoisted the flag sig-
nal ordering Nel·son to withdraw. When informed of the sig-
- nal, Nelson put his telescope to his blind eye and announced 
to his officers that he could not see it. 19 
18. Lord Grenville to the Earl of Carysfort, December 2, 1800. 
Re ort on the Manuscri ts of Jo Bo Fortes ue Es o Pre-
served at Dropmoreo IV London: Machie and Coo, Ltd~, 
1905)0 -
19. Carola Oman, Nelson.· (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1946), 
p. 446. 
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Ne1son 8 s willingness· to ·at-tack Copenhagen and his ~"· 
i'·· 
:} 
t{. 
- ti 
;_~ '; 
ti~ . 
L'. 
u; 
t 
f,i, 
-~\ 
spirited ;fire on· the enemy ships convinced the Danes that he !!: 
. --·-· . . _) . . ' \ fJ 
' . . . . .·... '· . . . : ' • • 
fi 
-------- -------·---- __ '._~-,----------'would--be·-·~-eontent----to----lose h-1-s- ent1re-.f-leet but that he--wou-ld----- ---. -·. ------l-
. . 
. 
I ~ 
. . 
. - . " . 
. ... · .. · . ij 
--:·------·----·-~·-·-:---· ~--,---'-----------·---des-tr:-Oy·---the---Danes ... in .. -the __ process_o ... ·······::·'.I'hey_ ... s:u._rrgnge.rec;l. .. ~_ ---- .. OP.~-~·---·····-···~-·-··'·--·--'-·-~-·--·-'---~-------1. 
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.~···· again, Nelson• s refusal to beiieve that the odds were too . 
heavy, his faith that the British would alway~ win, had paid 
.. - ..... ··---·-:~' :. 
1 
~ . 
l ij 
l 
r ;\ 
rl l.l 
~ 
"'""' fl 
- --- ll' · off handsomely. 
,- -
• 
~~~--==--, 
The victory left Nelson free to move against the other 
Powers. But the advent of a pro-English government in Russia 
removed both their threat to naval stores and Nelson's threat 
to them. Aware Of their now untenable position, the Swedes 
. 20 
and Prussians also backed down. Thus the last naval chal-
lenge to Great Britain was ended. 
Yet the victory of Copenhagen only served to emphasize 
England's great problem. Although she won all the great 
\ 
battles -- the Glorious First of June, St. Vincent, Campel-
down, and the Nile -- she was not winning the war. The British 
ha.d known when war began that they might earn and maintain con-
trol of the sea, but they alone could not defeat France. Be-
cause England was an island that depended on imports for her 
food, her commerce, indeed, her very existence, she had to 
retain control of the sea to survive. 
20. Annual.Register, 1801. 101-102 
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·France was an entirely diff~rent case.· Even if every 
·· French ship was_ sunk, France. would be crippled but not killed. 
~---No_t-:_only was France far closer to economic self-sufficiency, 
h - --- - M ••••• •• - •-•• -•- ~ • -- -•- --•- • - • h - •••- •- • • •··•·-•·"'•·"•·-•••••••••'"•••••-.. -•••••-·•-·•••----•••••~ ~~-----·-··-·---.. ------·---:-· ___ .......;..._. _____ · __ -·"··--. --. _-----but····she mai·n·tairfeid ·over·l-a:nd:-"·trade with all of Europe. Thus, 
,, 
.'. 
' 
a victory over France required a large_ army, an army England 
simply did ~ot have. 
Consequently, England was forced.to rely on.the armies 
of other nations. These armies, such as the Austrian or 
t .; Prussian troops, required larg~ English subsidies. The:p, ·'._.to9 j 
since.they were organized as relatively small, professional 
~--···· .. ····-' 
armies, they were seldom able to defeat the massive and enthu-
siastic French citizen-soldiers. 
As a result, England found herself constantly rent~ng 
losing armies. The modest gains made in war, such as the new 
~ revenue from French colonies, were more than lost on the scat-
tered battlefields of Europe. These unsuccessful campaigns 
were enormously expensive. Pitt was obliged to increase 
~/ 
taxes drastically, to introduce the income tax, and to bor-
row heavily. All of these measures produced great hardships 
in England. While taxes continued to rise, so did the price 
-~-
Pitt then had· to contend with wide::----of staples such as wheat. 
. -----~ -------~------
spread popular unrest and discontent • 
.,,. 
' And yet for what were the ha~dships endured? Although 
. 
_/ ... . j 
Britain won all the naval battles, she remained equidistant 
from total victory or peace. Thus, victories seemed to earn 
.• . 
' 
., 
: • • ... ; •. c. .:.....;:_ - -· '-. • - ·..c·•'- '.,. ; - ....... -- ,,·1- ..... 
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• • _....; < -
. . 
. 
. -r~·-·-·-, .. ·-""-·---'i:: - f, -i;,i$-#Ai¥d;a; ...... ..;;;.~~J.£::..;_.::g:;~~~!~0~·~:~-2~·~-~ .. ~-~:· ~ ~---.:~ -··._:.. -~> ---:~ .. -:::--.-~:-.-~·:·-; ";·,.--~-;~::· ,_-··--:-~-._-~·- --~-,-_ · __ ---~·:_~_ :·: 0 : ·:··.'.:-~.-;:-~--;·· --~-.:·· .-::·.:_. ·:··:·::~---=--_,_:;- ~-:,- ..... ,_ :::··~::~-.--~·._-~-::-· -~···-->-' '".;''·:_':·~/-·-·,-- e.:- :::··. ,- ,._,-- ···_._-:--·- ·.----._- ... -:.:-;-·-,-·_::~_ ... ·-· -, •. ·:·----: ~------:-:- .----- .. ~--~_-:-___ ·._--:···-----:~.-' ---· . 
the right to continue to f_ight • 
. ' 
"After eight years of this ·depressing conflict, <.', 1\ 
• ! 
J----······---·--··-··----0----·---~~---·-· ·resigned. - ···Whether-he·· quit--·over · tl"re-1 r tsn ·questi-on ·or ·to· ·- ,--"~--. ·· ----~ ·--. · . -~··· . 
. ' 
-..... -....... ,, ... , .. -, 
' ' 
make way for a Minlstry committed to peace is uncertain. 21 
Iri · any·-··event-~: Henry Addington succeeded him in February 1801. 
---------~- - Addington -took over an office. burdened wi t.h many problems~~ 
··. Bread riots, war, famine, l)e,avy taxes, £inancial crises -- a11· 
,. were Addington•s inheritance. As France could not win at sea 
.,~ .. ; .. .; . and England could not win on land, as _neither Addington nor 
•. 
.., Napoleon had any reason to continue such ~.!?- indecisive war, 
and-as both had excellent reasons for ending it, the peace 
of Amiens was signed in March of 1802. 
For the first time in nine years, the French and English 
.had stopped shooting at e~ph other. 
. ' 
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For a discussion of the Irish question, see J. Stephen Watson, Reign of Geor e III: 1760-1815. Vol. X of The 
~xfordHistory. of Englando Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) po 387 ffo For his domestic problems, see William Hunt, The Histor of En land from the Accession of Geor e III to the Close of ·pi tt O s First Administration 1760-1801) Volo X of The Political History of Englando (Lon-don: Longman, Green and Co., 1905). p. 434 ff. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
I 
------·------- .The interaction of--personaliti.es had .. a-,profound,-,.effect-- ~------· .. ----,------~---------·-·------
~-
,: . . on the course of this war. . The lack of leadership by Lord 
,. C 
_; _______ ~-:---;---,--~-,:..._-. ---,~----------.------Gh-a-t.h-am----i-n---th_e------ear-l~iest--····day-s----a-llowe·d·--Dunda:s·-- ···to--o~-~-·;much··- ·vo-1·ce·-----------·--_--"---_ .~--------·-----·'----
.. ', 
in naval affairs, and the earliest opportunities of hurting 
the French·were missed • 
.... ...... ..,,. ... ~ -, . ~ 
.. The advent of Lord ·Spencer as First Lord marked the 
beginni·ng .of a strong rule by the Admiralty. Spencer clashed 
with Lord Hood, and fired.him •. The First Lord then gave the 
Mediterranean fleet to Admiral Hotham, who promptly in·is-used 
· -it. Thus, the· perso.:nal clash between Spencer and Hood part-
-
·, 
· ly caused the British· loss·;, of control in the Mediterranean. ·· 
Spencer also clashed with Middleton over the appointment 
of Christian to the West Indies. This dispute cost Britain 
the services of one of her most talent.ea al though most vexing 
Admirals. In addition Spencer was obliged to order the 
court-martial of Admiral Cornwallis,· al though that court------· --· ~----·-
martial, composed of more Admirals than had ever before formed. 
a sing~e court, unanimously upheld Cornwallis.-
Then, too,. Lord Howe hurt the Navy when he £_ailed to 
inform his old antagonist, Lord Bridport, that a mutiny was 
breiving in Bridpor·t • s fleet. This act alone might have cost 
Britain the \var, for if the French had attacked \vhile the fleet 
was in mutiny, England might have been beaten. In any event, 
..... ' ~ 
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i 
r 
I 
/! 
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- ., 
- so--
..... . . 
• \l •• 
-·-- - Howe• s animosity toward Bridport cost the fleet commander 
- -- ---~ -~- -- ------ ----- - - -- - -------· 
any oppo·rtuni ty ::.of~ heading off _ the muti-ny. 
..... 
- - -•. - . . . 
.,,:.,-.. ,. ,_ ~- ,-· . ~-· 
-On the other hand, th~re were many instances when -
\ 
~--· · -__ -"-----i)ersona-1---relations-hips-··ai-ded-·-·the--·-war eff·ort-;···--·-----·-·I·t ·was··-~-spen-. : -~--__ --~-------,--_-~-·-------·-·.:. ____ _ 
.'.:·, 
.. 
• 
-·- -- -- -
cer•s friendship with Nelson that produced Nelson's command ~ 
• 
i 
. •. 
. in the Mediterranean and so led to the victory of the Nile.· 
Then, too, -it was Spencer's decisions which put Duncan - -· -__ - __ . ~-· ·. ··--- -~ .. 
and Jervis in.command in time for the battles of Campeldown 
and St. Vincent. 
Indeed, the Navy had done all that could be expected of 
it. - It. captured nearly all the French colonies. It pro·tect-
ed British trade so successfully that trade rose from-(44, 500, 00 
in 1792 torl73,750,00 in 1801. 1 ,.,( Finally, the Navy prevented 
. -
- ' '\ .
··--------.----·--~ ---·-------·-- -----any .serious invasion of Great Britain. 
\ ' 
n 
On the other hand, the Navy bad made-mistakes. Howe's 
victory of the Glorious First·of June did not prevent the 
-French fleet from landing the vital imported grain. Further, 
while Howe captu~ed six French ships, he nonetheless left the 
·main French battle fleet intact. 
---~ 
Then, too, there were serious errors of naval strategy. 
1.- William Hunt, The His~ory.of England from the Accession of Gear e III to the Close of Pitt 0 s First Administration 
1760-1801 o Volo X of The Political History of England •. {London: Longman•s Green & Co., 1905), p. 443. 
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Failure to initiate a ciose blockade of France until 1800 . . . . . . - ·, .. : ____ .~:_. --------~·-·----·------·-· -- -- -~ 
allowed the French to .sail at wille Twice ,the army alone 
defeated an invasion of Great Britain. The· ships carrying.· · 
~ 
. 
. 
. · · . .· __ .·_·'. ______ the .... inv.asi.on.forces ...... should ... never-have-been--able to leave-········· --·-·- ·.- . - ' 
their ports, for by.the time these attempts were ~ade, Brid-
- ____ ~-~·-'-~·· _______ j)(?J:"t had ample power to seal them· in their· harbours. · 
D 
.... _:· ______ .... ,_: ___ -,-- - - - __ ·. -------·- -- - . -
' 
Another serious error was the failure to initiate seamen•s· 
.-, .... / 
reforms'. · Because so few reforms were enacted after the mutinies 
.. . 
of Spithead and the.Nore, sporadic mutinies occurred through-· 
out the fleet for the duration of the war •. While Pitt's 
: government could not afford to pay ~the seamen higher wages 
. because of· the critical lack of cash, it could have begun 
the non-financial reforms far sooner. 
. •.. -·-··· .... :..._, __ :., .. --= -- -- -- . -- - - --~-- --. - ____ ..... - . - - - ··-
While these errors are easily detected by hindsight, most 
of them appeared to the participants as distinct advantages. 
For example, Howe did not believe he had the strength to block-
, .. ade. Then, too, for Hotham or Howe to win great victories, 
they would have had to risk great defeat~ Each felt that main-
taining the strength of his fleet was more important than one 
victory, for only their fleets kept the French out of Britain. 
A naval defeat for France, a land power, would be an incon-
venience; a naval defeat for Great Britain could have been a 
catastrophe. Then, too, regarding ~dmiralty reforms, the Sea 
Lords were too concerned with manning and maneuvering great 
fleets to worry about the conditions of individual seamen on 
individual shipse 
.. 
. . 
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On the other hand, the Navy learned some valuable -
· 1essons .. in the war o for the first time sin_ce Henry VIII 
had.mounted ,the broadside of a.warship, the Navy learned how 
to use this weapon effectively .• 2 Instead of forming the clas-
- ---·------····------- ·---- . ·- --- ·------------- ----~ ··-·· - __ _:_ __ . --_---- ·-" ---- --· --·-;-·· -•-- .. --, .c. -·········· .. ·-- -- ' ,-, - ' ---- ........ ______ -_--· ._ .. _. '•' _ .. :·- .. ~,::,~~-· 
·l· •. 
·.sic line of battle in single· fleet to fle·e·· over the horizon, 
Admirals such·as Duncan and Nelson introduced new.procedures. 
·.,;- Duncan cut· the Dutch line of retreat which ·.forced them to 
e 
fight the battle of canipl'edoW:, ··:· and N~lson atta.cked his enemies 
.even when they were protected in.fortified harbours such as 
,- ··-· ---· 
... 
., 
· at the Nile and at Copenhagen. The achievement · of Duncan 
and Ne,,lson :was not merely ·to wi-n b.ut to annihilate, and one· 
of Spencer's achievements was to appoint men such as these 
v to command the fleets •. · Tl1c} 
.. 
4 . 
.. 
• 
The Bri.tish N.avy began· the war in a stro_ng position, yet 
\ 
l ·-· 
-- ------------·---- . - ,- ···--~---···-· 
" . . ····-- ~~.---·-
took ten years to achieve only a stalemate. There are good 
reasons for this. First, France was basically a much stronger 
nation, outnumbering the English by nearly three to one, and 
.France was also economically relatively self-contained. While 
the loss of her sea-trade ,could hurt her, it could not kill 
-1 · her, for given good weather, France could feed herself. Then, 
too, her adequate resources were augmented by those of the 
numerous nations she conquered. 
.. 
2. Michael Le\vis, The History of the British Navy. (Lon-
don: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 155. 
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The basic difference in strength might have been over-. 
come by close cooperation among Brita.in' s .. allieso But the 
Prussians failed the English in Flanders, and the Spanish 
-· <: 
. . 
. 
·. 
-.---·-,··--------- : _____ -·----::-.-:-·~-• ~_:_---~---------:_f_ail ed_ them_=at .... Toul_on. _____ Thi s ___ l.ack ____ of _ ef f.e.cti.'Ve ____ co.oper.a.tion ___ ----------·-··----,-'---. _·-·_-,---------------
.•. 
-- --~------··-· -·- - . 
" 
. 
. . 
continued throughout the war. For example, if the Aus·trians 
had inf armed·· the Briti.sh ·that .. the battle of Mare·ngo was im-
- . . 
minent, the British ~avy might have been able tQ interf:ere · 
'="'..;: . 
~ . . 
:with Napoleon's.supply~ lines in Italy and th-qs ·possibly re-
verse the outcome of that battle. 
3 . . . 
Perh11ps one of the most important reasons why France 
did not do bett~r against its smaller opponent -was because 
the decrees of the Convention had disbanded both the trained 
~ . 
officers corps and the trained seamen. Then, too, as the war 
:..=.==:::::::::::::====---:------:---'.'"·--dragged on, the French concentrated their resources on the army 
_while neglecting the navy. Naval supplies were not purchased 
and ships were permitted to fall into disrepair. This neglect 
came from the failure of the French authorities to.understand 
the principles of seapower. 
·-
. :; . -· .,_, - .,:._ ...... ' " - _: 
This ignorance of naval affairs was fortunate for the 
British. For example, ·the situation of the British in 1797 
could not have been wors·e. The French, DUtch and Spanish fleets 
all opposed the English. The Royal Navy was engaged in a"' 
3. Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1946), p. 206. 
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massive mutiny. Duncan was blockading the entire Dutch 
- war fleet with only two ships. England was vi:ttually un-
defended. This was a time,· a short but real time, when a 
_,c: ., 'i: .. 
,. 
I 
-c-: ________________________________ -----~-----properly- handled--- -French-----fleet---would-- probal;:>ly-- have -had-dif---------------------·--------·------------: 
.".":.•" 
ficulty in losing. France did not take advantage of.this 
-- -- -- --- opportunity because she had poor leadership. 
" ... : ~ 
-· England survived this war because France could not use 
·her enormous land power on water. France survived-this war 
because England could not use her naval power on: .land. If . · --- " 
the French had used th-eir far greater resources to build up 
their navy, it is difficult to see how Britain would have 
survived. The stalemate was reached because British naval 
r 
-:;.. 
power was strong and French naval power weak. Neither power 
could beat the ·other, and both were exhausted spiritually and 
financially from trying. 
Perhaps the least satisfying fact about this war is 
that it resolved no issues. England, at enormous cost in 
lives, money, ships,.lost trade, heavy taxes, a much higher 
cost of living and much personal hardship, obtained none of 
her war aims. But such _a conclusion overlooks one crucial 
fact. The men who were trained in this war were to be the 
leaders of the next. The Nelson who would win at Trafalgar 
mastered the art of war in the school provided by the war .. 
against the French Republic.· In this way, the personalities 
"' that dominated this war, such as Spencer and St. yincent, had· 
-· ._,· 
,, 
; ,. . ' .. 
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• 
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·insured that England would have 
: , 
the personalities she would 
. ··»·----~ .. -· .......... 
ne.ed in the future. 
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-- ___ __________________________ --K~vin Charles Smith was born.in- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on December 21, 1946. He is the son of Joseph Neumann Smith (1910-1958) and Dorothy Sheehan Smith. 
He was educated at Holy Cross Grammar School and then attended Cardinal Dougherty High School_ .. in Phila-delphia. He entered LaSalle College in September of 1964 and received his B. A. in History in June 1968. In the fall of 1968, he entered Lehigh University. $ - ' 'l . ':, I' '  !
l 
,;t 
I 
-~-- -- ----· .--------. -----------~-
•, -.. • 
------------· 
• 
.... ·:·~-
·,: 
.... 
. -:-· 
•·it:' 
,. 
·" . ,-: •· 
,. 
! 
• l 
I 
I 
·1 
; 
I 
'ii 
~ 
'i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
i: 
• I, 
I 
j 
